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Abstract
   This study examined the role of self-interest among mainstream 
media in reporting related to media policies. Ideally, the press is 
objective and impartial. However, this is not always the case, and the 
most damage could result when the press practices biased reporting 
regarding public policies that could significantly affect society. This 
study addresses this phenomenon in the Korean press, specifically 
focusing on broadcast news reporting where objectivity and impartiality 
are especially required.  
   To that end, the study examined how rival broadcast companies in 
Korea reported on media policies that were closely related to their 
self-interest. Major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming 
channels, Korea’s major rival media groups, were selected for 
examination. News reports on the gross cap regulation of advertising 
time for terrestrial broadcasters, and re-approval of general 
programming channels were selected for analysis. These media policies 
are closely related to the interests of both terrestrial broadcasters and 
general programming channels. Furthermore, the policies have the 
potential to show biased reporting given that terrestrial broadcasters and 
general programming channels have distinctly different interests in 
regards to the two policies. Therefore, it can be reasonably expected 
that news reporting of terrestrial broadcasters and general programming 
channels differs on the policies. 
   Additionally, the study explored how stations belonging to the two 
broadcasting groups reported on the Korea Communications 
Commission (KCC) for the period when they covered the debates 
around the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
broadcasters, and re-approval of general programming channels. The 
study hypothesized that there would be less criticism of the KCC, the 
government regulatory agency that governs the adoption and 
implementation of media policies related to terrestrial broadcasters and 
general programming channels, by a media company that supported the 
adoption of media policies in line with its self-interests. 
   Finally, the study looked at the quality index for both terrestrial 
broadcasters and general programming channels. The quality index 
measured which broadcast companies aired more factually-based news 
reports despite the potential for biased reporting derived from 
mainstream media’s self-interest. If a news report was more factually 
based, the score was closer to +1, and if a news report was less 
factually based, the score was closer to –1. Means to calculate the 
quality index were created in the study.
   The study results were significant in two ways. First, most of the 
hypotheses regarding self-interested reporting were supported, which 
means that self-interested news reporting practices do exist in Korea. 
Specifically, the results showed that media firms reacted sensitively to 
media related policies and were likely to practice biased reporting that 
fit their self-interests. Second, the result showed that a public terrestrial 
broadcaster (KBS) demonstrated a higher quality index than a general 
programming channel (TV Chosun), which means that a public 
broadcasting company was more likely to practice factual news 
reporting than a private broadcasting company, which has more concern 
about economic profits. However, this study has limitations in that it 
only confirmed the existence of mainstream media’s self-interested 
reporting in Korean journalism rather than systematically explaining 
how related factors interacted and influenced the generation of biased 
news. In other words, it focused more on the final news product than 
the processes that led to that product. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1-1. Research background & research purpose
   The purpose of this study is to examine the role of self-interest 
among mainstream media in reporting related to media policies, 
specifically focusing on broadcast news reporting on the gross cap 
regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters and 
re-approval of general programming channels.  
   People watch news to better understand the world they live in. 
News provides the public with essential information about what is 
happening in the society. Therefore, the press is required to report 
news in an objective and impartial manner. Objectivity and impartiality 
are considered to be the key elements for legitimate journalism. 
Objectivity in journalism concerns fair and unbiased fulfilling of the 
interests of all interested parties(Schudson, 1978). Objectivity can be 
assessed through coverage patterns of news(Schudson, 1978). 
Objectivity is also regarded as a professional standard or strategy that 
classifies ‘opinion’ and ‘information’(Schiller, 1981; Schudson, 2001). 
However, as Lichtenberg(1991) pointed out, objectivity in the press 
does not mean that there is only one solution to a problem. 
'Objectivity in the press’ means that the press should implement the 
ideal regulative principle that the press can unbiasedly report on 
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matters(Lee, 2004). Then, what is impartiality in the press? It is 
difficult for the press to meet the standard that would satisfy every 
interested party in the conflict. Nonetheless, it is important for the 
press to view the event in the most neutral and balanced manner. 
Balance in news reporting means that every interested party is fairly 
interviewed and reported in the news. Impartiality means various 
opinions are reported on matters with conflicts of interest. It is 
important not to be fixated upon one point of view in order to be 
impartial(Youn, 2013).1)    
   But in reality, the press can not always be considered as objective 
and impartial. It is more fitting to say that the press has bias or 
inclination when reporting, and political and ideological inclination in 
the press has always drawn attention. In a sense, certain political or 
ideological inclination in the press is considered as the press’ inherent 
function. The problem arises, however, when a media firm expresses 
its “inclination” in a way that is favorable to its own interest or when 
the firms try to sway the public opinion to further their agendas. It 
can be reasonably argued that airing news reports intentionally tailored 
toward a media firm's self-interest can not only be considered to be 
unfair and unobjective, but also could interfere with the public interest, 
1) Lim(1993) simplifies all the different perceptions of fairness by defining it 
as just “impartial.” The BBC editorial guideline also defines fairness as 
not giving special treatment to any party in the interest but treating every 
party equally(The BBC Editorial Guideline, Section 4. Impartiality).
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for it provides the public with biased information and skewed 
perspectives. News reporting tailored toward media corporate 
self-interest causes the diminution or distortion of coverage. For 
instance, when an event is directly connected to the profits of a media 
firm, such phenomenon could occur. When media firms report on the 
matters related to their owners, they frequently report in a way that is 
favorable to the owners.2) Media firms also show a tendency to deny 
or downsize the events when the owners or workers of the firms are 
involved in societal or political scandal.3) Furthermore, media firms 
2) One such favorable reporting took place when Joongang Ilbo and the TBC 
tried to cover up and protect their mother firm, Samsung, when the 
Samsung saccharine smuggling incident occurred in the mid-1960s. In 
September 1966, Samsung was accused of smuggling an ingredient for 
saccharin, which was illegal at that time, to use at its fertilizer plants. 
This escalated into a major social problem and caused the public to 
become leery of the Park regime’s commitment to eradicate 
corruption(Kim, 1997). This incident is a typical example of self-interested 
news reporting. 
3) An example of such a reporting practice is demonstrated through the 
Chosun Ilbo’s handling of the 'Jang Jayeon Scandal'. Jang Jayeon, a South 
Korean actress, was found hanged at her home on March 7th, 2009. Her 
death caused a national scandal when it emerged that she had been 
sexually and physically abused by a number of prominent entertainment 
executives during her career, and that the abuse had contributed to her 
depression. When the involvement of Bang Sanghoon, the CEO of the 
Chosun Ilbo, in the scandal was brought up, the Chosun Ilbo downrightly 
denied the suspicion and filed a suit against politicians and the 
representatives of the Internet news firms, who cast a doubt on 
Bang(Media Today, 2015. 5. 22). The Chosun Ilbo lost on the first trial 
but did not lodge an appeal. In 1999, Joongang Ilbo was dubbed by 
public as “Bodyguard Press” when its CEO, Hong Seokhyun, was reported 
to the police for his charge for Bokang Tax Evasion and 40 plus reporters 
from the Joongang Ilbo lined up in front of the police station, shouting 
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tend to refrain from attacking the stakeholders of their sister companies 
or affiliates, while attacking their rivals in a blunt manner.4)    
   Out of all the media, broadcasting is the one to watch out the 
most for news reporting behavior tailored toward media corporate 
self-interest. Even though the media environment is rapidly changing in 
today’s society, broadcasting news continues to function (considering its 
exposure range and influential dimension) as the most important means 
for the public to comprehend what is happening in society(Kim & Lee, 
2008; Jung, 2009). Therefore, broadcast news, compared to news in 
other medium, is demanded by law and ethical guidelines to stick to 
the strictest fairness criteria. That is to say, broadcast news is innately 
obliged to practice fairness by reporting on matters as objectively and 
impartially as possible(Yoon, 2007). 
   There is a great deal of social interest in and concern for the 
fairness of broadcast news. However, recently there has been a lot of 
disputes over whether a TV news is fair or not. In 2008 during the 
candelight vigil, a social conflict broke out around whether TV 
“Hang in there, Boss!"(Pressian, 2008. 3. 5). Furthermore, when Hong was 
involved in the Samsung slush fund case, Joongang Ilbo put the news in 
the bottom of page 10 and also published articles that defended 
Hong(Pressian, 2008). 
4) For instance, if Joongang Ilbo reports an incident that is unfavorable to 
the Chosun Ilbo, the ChosunIlbo makes a counterattack against Joongang 
Ilbo. However, knowing this, rival companies sometimes refrain from 
attacking each other(to protect itself). In this case, rival companies show 
behavior that they mutually not report anything bad about each other. 
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programs, including <PD Notebook>, which  featured on the 
candlelight vigil incident, violated the broadcast fairness standard or 
not(Lee, 2008).5) Referring to this kind of phenomena, Inkyu 
Park(2007) argued that the Korean public broadcasting was far from 
carrying out its social role that is to promote ‘fairness.’ Minwoong 
Lee(2005) claimed that the spread of advocacy journalism, which only 
unilaterally advocates certain views instead of verifying and reviewing 
various views, was the main cause for such a  phenomenon in Korean 
society. 
   Although there have been many fairness controversies related to 
broadcast news reporting, biased news reporting tailored toward 
self-interest of a  broadcasting firm is one of the most problematic 
issues related to broadcast fairness. To be more clear, 'biased news 
reporting tailored toward 'a media firm's self-interest(hereinafter 
'self-interested reporting')' refers to the behavior of reporting biased 
news for the purpose of promoting the interest of a media firm or its 
owner/stakeholder. Such examples include: Not reporting an 
5) MBC became the subject of legal action. On 12 August 2008, the Korea 
Communications Standards Commission called for MBC to apologize to the 
public over misrepresentations made in the PD notebook program. MBC 
apologized through a two-minute broadcast, saying, "We would like to 
offer a sincere apology to our viewers (over the report)." MBC conceded 
that six translation errors had been made and that downer cattle had been 




incident/issue that is unfavorable to the owner or the CEO of their 
own firm, promoting their firm's programs, or social contribution, and 
continuously reporting news that is only favorable to their own firms, 
etc. For instance, recently the KBS featured on the news that its TV 
program <Special Live Program for Separated Family Reunion> - 
which helps people find out and reunite with long separated family 
members - was designated as a World Cultural Heritage by UNESCO. 
The problem was that the KBS featured the fact in the main news 
segment multiple times. Another instance was that in June 2013, KBS 
aired news that KBS would be hosting a show during President Park’s 
visit to Beijing in the main news segment. The TV Reporters’ 
Alliance(2014) commented that “KBS put this news, which is not of 
the main news element, in the main news segment. It is an example 
of self-interested reporting." On the other hand, when it comes to 
reporting on a rival press, broadcast firms often show a behavior of 
'criticism for the sake of criticism.' In August 2015, <Media Inside>, a 
media criticism program of the KBS, harshly criticized general 
programming channels for their lowbred programs under the title of 
“Panels in general programming channels with bombarding rough 
words.” Partiuclarly, it extensively criticized general programming 
channels for their "gonzo" journalism, making a referral to the amateur 
and inappropriate statements made by the panels(Newsfinder, 2015. 8. 
31.). However, <Media Inside> chose to have an interviewee from the 
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Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media, a representative civic group 
of the progressive camp, to denounce the perspectives of the panelists 
who were critical of certain behaviors of the people from the 
progressive camp, even though the words that the panelists used for 
criticism were actually far from being rough or lowbred(Newsfinder, 
2015. 8. 31.). This instance shows that the KBS simply chose to 
criticize its rivals for the purpose of denouncing, rather than to 
legitimately criticize them for journalistic purposes. This case is another 
example of a news reporting for promoting corporate self-interest in 
which a media company intentionally reports negatively on its rivals.
1-2. Self-interested reporting and broadcast news 
coverage on media policies
  
   The most problematic type of self-interested reporting is when 
media firms show such behavior in dealing with public issues. If the 
press reports biased news on the public issue where the public interest 
is at stake, the consequence can be even more serious. Media policies 
are such public issues. Since media policy gravely affects the media 
industry, including media firms' interests, media firms are tempted to 
report on certain issues in a way that could benefit themselves. For 
instance, newspapers and broadcasters which had different interests in 
relation to the revision of the cross media ownership rule in the 
- 8 -
'Broadcasting Act', attempted to influence the revision process during 
the years of 2008~2009(Mediaus, 2009. 2. 17.).6) Broadcasting 
companies’ lopsided coverage on the raise of the TV license fee was 
also the subject of controversy. The Korea Communications Standards 
Commission(KCSC) made a decision of 'suggestion of opinion' for 
KBS' unfair coverage of the issue. The reputation of the KBS as a 
public broadcaster, which is required to be more impartial than any 
other private broadcasters, was tarnished by this incident. As a result, 
the incident dealt a blow to the viewers' trust in KBS(Media Today,  
2014. 7. 14.). major terrestrial broadcasters(KBS, MBC, SBS) were also 
criticized for their reporting behaviors that put their self-interests before 
the public interest in relation to the issue of 700Mhz spectrum 
allocation. The criticism dealt mostly with the fact that the three 
companies extracted comments from politicians or seminars that were 
favorable to their own interests, and only used those extracts when 
covering the news(Chosun Ilbo, 2014. 11. 13.). Besides this, their 
dealing with other media policy issues, including the issue of 
deregulation of broadcast  advertising for the purpose of promoting 
their interests have been the subject of controversy. 
   Self-interested reporting behavior is further heightened with the 
6) One of the key issues in the reform measure was the planned lifting of a 
ban on cross-ownership in the media industry. Democrats had fiercely 
resisted the changes, claiming that they could give conglomerates and 
newspapers undue influence over network television stations. 
(http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2901743).
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recently intensifying competition among the TV channels as a result of 
the launch of general programming channels affiliated with the 
influential conservative newspapers in the broadcasting turf in 2011. 
general programming channels have displayed clash of interests with 
existing terrestrial broadcasters over many issues. Through their news 
reports focused on their self-interests, terrestrial broadcasters and 
general programming channels attempted to influence the policy making 
process in the direction that would be beneficial to themselves.
   Why is self-interested reporting not acceptable in journalism then? 
It is because news reporting used as a means to produce a certain 
outcome can be considered the so-called 'activism'(Brewer, 2015).7) 
When news reporting is used as a means to promote a specific 
purpose, it is not journalism anymore but just a tool to achieve a 
desired outcome. Viewers/readers lose trust in such reporting and 
eventually the press itself(Lee & Choi, 2005). If this happens, the 
press cannot function as a guide for social reality and the democratic 
deliberation is hindered, thus resulting in society ending up in 
abnormal conditions. Particularly, self-interested reporting on media 
policies is not desirable, because media policy is very important in 
terms of forming social interactions, public opinions, and important 
national policies that could become the groundwork of democratic 
decisions. The influence of media policy has on society makes it one 
7) Brewer said, “journalists should not have a desired outcome - that’s 
activism.”
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of the important public policy. 
   Existing discussions on fairness in broadcasting have been mostly 
about the problems related to political control on broadcasting. 
However, as considered so far, the problem of biased news reporting 
tailored toward broadcasters' self-interest is another serious and 
important issue in Korean journalism(Yoon, 2007; Yoo, 2009). 
Reasonable regulations on self-interested reporting are necessary to deal 
with the side effects of it. However, there is a dearth of studies that 
deal with this issue, and most of them simply describe how the 
behavior of self-interested reporting prevails in the broadcasting sphere 
rather than analyze why such behaviors take place and how they can 
be confronted. An analytical approach on this phenomenon will allow 
us to deal with the problem more systematically. 
   In this context, this study aims to investigate news reporting 
behaviors of broadcasting companies on media policies, which are 
closely related to the companies' corporate interests. 
   To that end, the study first examines the general factors that 
influence media content. Then it narrows its focus on the role of 
media firms' self-interest(media corporate self-interest) as one 
influencing factor that could cause biased news report, particularly in 
relation to media policy issues. The study then goes over the details of 
news reporting behaviors caused by media corporate self-interest. It 
then investigates how different groups of broadcasting organizations 
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deal with media policy issues, on which each group has different 
interests, in their news reports. For the investigation, the study 
compares self-interested reporting behaviors of major terrestrial 
broadcasters(SBS, MBC, KBS) and general programming channels(TV 
Chosun, MBN, Channel A, JTBC), given that the two groups have 
conflicting views about certain media policy issues.8) The study chose 
the following two topics as media policy issues for analysis in that 
these two are the representative media policies on which the interests 
of major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels 
clearly conflict: (a) the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters, and (b) re-approval of general programming 
channels. Based on the potential co-relation between media corporate 
self-interest and biased news reporting on media policies, the study 
suggests an analytical model specification and research hypotheses. 
8) major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels show 
distinctively different interests on several matters.
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review
   This chapter first considers general influential factors that could 
have effect on media content, and then moves on to the specifics on 
the role of media corporate self-interest as one of the factors. As one 
of the theoretical perspectives for the review, the chapter considers 
Shoemaker & Reese(1996)’ explanation about organizational effect on 
media content particularly in that media corporate self-interest can be 
categorized as an 'organizational level' of influence. Since there is a 
dearth of existing researches on media corporate self-interest and news 
reporting, related researches on how media ownership affects media 
content will also be  examined. After reviewing general discussion of 
the influence of media corporate self-interest on media content, the 
chapter will focus the discussion on how media corporate self-interest 
affects news reporting particularly on media policy issues. 
2-1. Factors influencing media content
   In this section, I will consider the factors that influence media 
content. But before examining the factors, it is necessary to understand 
journalism. 
   Journalism is for building community and democracy. Increasingly 
more people today are empowered by a free flow of information and 
directly involved in influencing their governments and creating new 
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rules for their political, social, and economic lives(Kovach & 
Rosenstiel, 2001). People believe that journalists should work in the 
public interest. Although technology changes the means of how news is 
delivered, there already exists a clear philosophy of how journalism 
should function “The primary purpose of journalism is to provide 
citizens with the information they need to be free and 
self-governing"(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). As Tom Brokaw, a former 
NBC anchormen, commented, “the news media should serve as a 
watchdog and offer a voice to the forgotten”(Brokaw, 1999, interview 
by William Damon, Howard Gardner, and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi). 
With so many things happening in the society, journalists not only 
should decide what the public should know, but also help audiences 
make order out of what they know. According to Kovach & 
Rosenstiel(2001), the first task of a new journalist is to verify what 
information is reliable and then order the information so people can 
grasp them efficiently. Before, in some parts of the world, the 
limitations to the pursuit of the truth took forms of 
government-censoring. However, in the 21st century in which the 
information flows and the technology evolves very quickly, the new 
limitation takes in the form of commercialism. We call it 'market 
driven journalism'. Material incentives create business and free market 
economy and the media is affected by commercialism.
   But if you ask what the ideal journalism should be, journalism’s 
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first obligation must be an approximation to the truth. When asked 
what values they consider paramount, 100 percent of journalists 
interviewed for a survey by the Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press and the Committee of Concerned Journalists(CCJ) 
answered “getting the facts right”(CCJ and the Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press, 1999). However, what is the “truth?” 
Everyone has certain biases and different perceptions; truth can vary 
with different lenses and perspectives. This is why journalists view 
truth as more of a process than an end itself. Patty Calhoun, the editor 
of the alternative weekly paper Westword said, “You can certainly 
pursue accuracy and fairness and the truth, and that pursuit 
continues”(Calhoun, at CCJ Chicago forum, 6 November, 1997.) In 
journalism, the desire that information be truthful is elemental. The 
“journalistic truth” is merely more than just being accurate. According 
to Kovach & Rosenstiel(2001), the first principle of journalism, its 
disinterested pursuit of truth, “is ultimately what sets it apart from all 
other forms of communications.” In his book News Values, journalist 
Jack Fuller, explains that journalists should get the facts straight and 
make sense of the facts(Fuller, 230). To sum up, journalistic truth is a 
process, a continuing journey toward understanding. Truthfulness can be 
tested by subordinate concepts such as fairness and balance.  A lot of 
researches on media impartiality consider it as unbiased and balanced 
(not partial to one side) behavior. Gump(2002) stated to practice media 
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fairness, a reporter should exclude his personal perspective and report 
on every related party’s views equally(Youn, 2015). In a similar 
context, McQuail(1992) views media fairness as balance in the choice 
and use of sources that is both quantitatively and qualitatively 
well-balanced. Thus, ideally the press should report on matters  
impartially on both quantitative and qualitative level.  
   However, there are many factors that harm journalism’s path 
towards ideal impartial journalism. These factors should be identified to 
accurately diagnose the cause of the unfair, biased news in 
broadcasting. 
<Figure 1> Model of a Hierarchy of Influences on Media Content 
Source: Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 141
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<Figure 1> shows Shoemaker & Reese(1996)’ model of a hierarchy of 
influences on media content. From the greatest range to the smallest 
level are ideological level, extra-media level, organization level, media 
routine level, and finally the smallest, individual level.  Shoemaker & 
Reese(1996) clarify their model by citing the organizational structure of 
newspapers(see figure 2). Through the structure, they explain how 
company system affects its content.
<Figure 2> Newspaper’s Organizational Structure
Source: Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 191
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   The tendency of the owner of an organization, ownership 
structure(public or private), the governance within an organization and 
many other factors directly and indirectly influence the final 
determination of content. Bagdikian(1987) found out, using 'Mother 
Jones' case, that media's organizational characteristics have a 
considerable amount of effect on content decisions. To be more 
specific, media struggle not to lose their advertisers; thus, even if an 
individual reporter strives to report on things in the most “idealistic” 
manner, if it goes against a certain goal/interest of the company, then 
it is very difficult for that work to be published. Even though media 
is prone to criticism for such acts, it is a common phenomenon in the 
press to pursue and choose news that can be  profitable. In other 
words, for most organizations the primary goal is economic, to make a 
profit. Shoemaker & Reese(1996) state that such a phenomenon, when 
a reporter’s autonomy is inhibited by the company, happens more 
frequently when the company is having a hard time acquiring its 
advertising resources(in which it depends most on for the earnings). 
Media sociologists, such as Herbert Gans and Leon Sigal, typically 
view economic considerations as constraints on news work and, thus, 
as indirect influences on editorial decisions(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). 
A case of KTVY-TV demonstrates such a phenomenon. When the  
number of workers and earnings of the KTVY-TV dropped, the media 
company chose to reutilize articles, which were already written, with 
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more pictures than before, rather than trying to recruit more capable 
reporters for a better coverage of news. Even after the improvement of 
the company’s financial structure, the decline of the quality of news 
continued because the company continuously tried to cut down on the 
expenditure of news making and maximize the profit(Shoemaker & 
Reese, 1996). The governance within an organization also affects on 
the media’s content decisions. It is a likely scenario that if a 
governance within an organization has a lot of power and cares more 
about other things than “realizing a true journalism,” then the final 
content of the media is expressed differently(i.e., inapproximately to the 
truth). In other words, figures within an organization are not sometimes 
really strong at resisting outside pressure. Gitlin(1980), too, points out 
that even a so called “media elites” violate from time to time the 
standard of journalism. Gans(1979) also states that the influence of the 
chief editor or the executives on the content making is excessive. The 
ownership and policy of the company also have an influence on 
content decisions. In the end, in order to better understand why media 
content is the way it is, comprehension of the organization’s policy or 
strategy through its inside dynamics is a must. On the surface, the 
most influential factor would be the head of the company who decides 
the company’s policies,9) but from an organizational perspective, the 
9) The content in media differ depending on ownership, the goal and policies 
of the company. However, in every media, the final say belongs to the 
owner(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The owner of the media “fundamentally 
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pursuit of economic profit that is directly related to survival of 
company, also plays a huge role in determining media content. 
   While Shoemaker & Reese(1996)’ reviews of the hierarchical model 
are confined to media ownership and governance, McManus(1994) 
explains further using the concept “market-driven journalism.” McManus 
shows how news reporters breach the objectivity of journalism for 
market-oriented interest. Back to Shoemaker & Reese(1996), they assert 
that company’s profit-driven operation and management have more 
influence on determination of which contents are in the news and 
which are not, rather than an individual news reporter. Therefore, a 
company’s guidelines/goals can frequently collide with an individual 
reporter’s journalistic morals(Barkin, 2003). For instance, when a news 
company targets certain customers, it can provide news that fit their 
tastes. The reason why the reporting style of general programming 
channels and major terrestrial broadcasters differ can be understood in 
such aspects. In the end, it is only possible to achieve ideal journalism 
only when the press itself strives for truth and objectivity. In this 
aspect, although press should represent all the parties in controversial 
issues, in reality, it just does not so due to several factors influencing 
the content(Attaway-Fink, 2005). 
determines the values and the direction of management”(Kovach & 
Rosenstiel, 2001/2003, p. 95). In other words, a reporter or producer 
determines “the style of journalism”(Harcup, 2009, p.18) but the media 
owner and the governance have the most influence on forming the frame 
of news(Breed, 1955). 
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   The same goes for coverage on government’s media policies. The 
reason lies in a very competitive market system. It is essential for a 
media firm that a media policy unfolds in a direction that is 
favorable/profitable to its own interests, for that is directly related to 
its survival. McManus’ commercial news production model is suitable 
in explaining why general programming channels show a certain types 
of reporting behaviors on the issues that are in conflict with their own 
interests. Both researches of Shoemaker & Reese(1996) and 
McManus(2004) show that news organizations can commercialize even 
its ideology for economic gains. In this aspect, even though KBS, 
SBS, and MBC are all major terrestrial broadcasters, KBS shows a 
reporting tendency that is a little bit different from that of the other 
two. For terrestrial broadcasters  and general programming channels, 
there exist not only a goal for profit-making but also a political goal 
to expand their influence in Korean society. In this aspect, McManus’ 
market-driven journalism and Shoemaker & Reese’(1996) research 
suggest that it is necessary to examine content decision factors 
including uneconomic factors like social influence. 
   Going further, media content is also influenced by occupational 
routine of mass media workers(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Karl 
Mannheim, a German  sociologist, states that people are social 
creatures and take part in a certain pattern of actions(that they 
themselves have not created). Consequently, people speak their group’s 
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language and think their group’s thought. Thus, as an individual of a 
group, people have formed a certain reaction/thought pattern for a 
certain situation(Mannheim, 1936/1964 cited in Shoemaker & Reese, 
1996). This certain pattern of thought and action is called “routine.” 
And this routine functions as a kind of guideline or limitation for 
media workers. Shoemaker & Reese(1996) gives an example of a 
gate-keeper to explain about routine. A book publisher must choose 
one title out of many, a TV channel programmer must choose which 
TV program to put in prime-time, a newspaper editor must choose 
which event to put in the front page. And these choices affect the 
media content that the public see. 
   Here, we must ask a question. Are these choices merely made by 
certain individuals? Shoemaker & Reese(1996) explains that in many 
situations, it is not so. For instance, there is a certain routine that 
news reporters use when they collect information, when they write 
articles, and when editors choose which articles to put in the paper. 
This routine is called selecting value of news(and this is one of many 
routines in the media industry). Traditionally, the factors that the press 
consider when they are selecting value of news are already decided. 
This routine predicts what news will be enjoyed and be considered 
important by reviewers, and function as a guideline for a gate-keeper 
to choose which article to put in the paper.10) The routine for news 
10)  “Production routines embody assumptions about audiences... the audience 
is part of a routinized way of life....When it comes to thinking about the 
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value includes the importance of an event, interest, controversy, 
unusualness, timeliness, and proximity(Stephens, 1980). There are many 
routines other than those about news values like one that is used for 
dealing with international disputes, one for interviewing experts, and 
one for gate-keeping, etc. And these routines ultimately affect media 
content by functioning as a kind of guideline and limitation for media 
workers. As discussed so far, many factors can be considered as the 
elements that can influence the news content.  Then, more specifically, 
what is the role of media corporate self-interest in journalism?
2-2. The role of media firms' self-interest in journalism
1) Self-interested reporting by mainstream media 
   In the previous section, a number of factors that affect media 
content were considered. There are many different factors, such as 
politics, markets, professional routines, governance within an 
organization, disposition of a media owner, etc., that affect media 
content and mar fairness in news reporting. This section will be 
devoted to one of the most problematic factors that have an influence 
on media content: media corporate self-interest. In reality, news 
kind of news most relevant to the audience, newsmen exercise their news 
judgement rather than going out and seeking specific information about the 
composition, wants or tastes of those who are being addressed"(Schlesinger, 
1978, pp. 115-116).
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reporting biased with corporate self-interest is common in the press and 
is increasing in broadcasting news(see Figure 3). 
<Figure 3> Self-interested Reporting by Korea's major newspapers
          (2014. 8. 1~2015. 7. 31)
Source: Media Today, 2015.8.11.
<Figure 3> shows the result of a research by Media Today about the 
self-interested reporting behavior in the main stream newspapers about 
terrestrial broadcasters and the Internet portal services. According to it, 
from August 1st of 2014 to 31st of July 2015, Donga Ilbo had 104 
self-interested reporting items, while Chosun Ilbo had 80 of such items, 
Maeil Kyungjae had 53, and Joongang Ilbo had 32. From this, we can 
tell that the behavior of self-interested reporting is prevalent in the 
Korean press.
   Let us consider how self-interested reporting by a news media 
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driven at the organizational level affects media content. What is 
self-interested reporting, then? According to a Korean dictionary, 
self-interested reporting refers to "news reporting behaviors that only 
account for the interests of one’s own company and not considering 
general society’s benefit." That is to say, self-interested reporting is a 
biased reporting that is in accordance with private interest of the media 
company and the owner. In this sense, this study defines self-interested 
reporting as "the news reporting behavior that is organized to pursue a 
goal and interest of a media company set by the highest management 
group and the CEO." Media's self-interested reporting is more of an 
outcome of an organizational influence on media content rather than of 
an individual level of influence, because such behavior is relative to 
the interest or goal of a company that are specifically set by the 
highest authority group and the owner. In order to learn about the 
mechanism in which self-interested reporting takes place, I will look 
into the mechanism of organizational control over media content.  
   The whole press acts in a systematic coherent manner towards 
profits and goals set by the highest organizational authority and owner. 
A leader of an organization carries out and makes policies for the 
benefit of an organization(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Thus, here an 
organization functions as a gatekeeper(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). A 
press organization is composed of a hierarchical levels of bureaucracy 
consisting a reporter, an editor, an editor-in-chief, the management, etc., 
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and at each level exits a gatekeeper. For instance, a reporter’s article 
is monitored by an editor, an editor by an editor-in-chief, an 
editor-in-chief by the management. Therefore, even if the working 
class(such as a reporter) writes an article from the perspective of a 
“professional,” if a higher level says no, the article cannot reach the 
public. For example, a press organization suggests its reporters not to 
be politically active to maintain fairness(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). 
However the same does not go for those in the highest bureaucratic 
level like business owner. This is because the owner of a press firm 
has created a certain organizational goal that surpasses any kind of 
influence from an individual reporter or an editor. 
   Shoemaker & Reese(1996)' discourse on organizational influence on 
media content is mostly related to a company’s economic profit, 
especially related to advertising earnings. This is particularly true in the 
U.S. media market where there exists almost no regulation on the 
press organizations and the press organizations are primarily run by the 
market principle. Therefore, there is not much private interest 
relationship related to government’s public policy in the U.S., 
especially related to the press organizations. Bagdikian(1983) states that 
in the U.S. press market, the economic factors is the most influential 
and because of that, public is robbed of chances to understand the 
“real world.” Although the economic factor is the most influential in 
the U.S., the researches acknowledge media ownership as very 
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influential as well. Most researches related to media ownership in the 
U.S. criticize influential media owners who control the press’ 
ideological tendency and reporting(McChesney, 1999).  
   Shoemaker & Reese(1996) argue that a press organization imposes 
its policies on its individual journalists through unspoken and subtle 
pressure, which will have them conform to the company's rules. If one 
of the rules require its journalists not to write a news article, which is 
critical of or unfavorable to its owner, and one of the journalists do 
not like the rule, then he/she can quit the company anytime and the 
company can replace him/her with other person. Those who follow the 
rules are rewarded with a promotion or wage raise. According to 
Turnstall(1971), the policies of the most companies are traditional and 
relatively fixed. The journalists learn such unwritten rules through 
experience and observation of what kind of news the company reports. 
The news articles that better serve the company's goal(more precisely, 
a goal that is related to the owner's interest) can be aired or published, 
whereas the news articles, which do not serve the company's goal, are 
cut out by the editor. Therefore, in order to get recognition, journalists 
have to write news articles that better fit the company's goal through 
self-censorship. Ultimately, the owner owns the power at the 
organizational level, and create and enforce the company's rules that 
are relevant to his/her own interests. Therefore, news reporting for a 
media firm's self-interest is influenced by the company's system of 
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recruiting, promotion, reward and self-censorship, which journalists 
practice when writing a news article in order to comply with the 
company's rules. 
   Then how does the goal at the organizational level of domestic 
media companies appear to influence content? Many scholars point out 
that domestic media companies tend not to get out of the control at 
the organizational level. Sanghyun Kang(2014. 11. 8.) argues that 
"MBC(Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation)'s organizational culture in the 
past was cultivated through pride and self-esteem." According to him, 
production autonomy was recognized and MBC's broadcasting culture 
was created in such an environment, but now, external pressure and 
internal conflicts co-exist(Medius, 2014. 11. 8.)  His diagnosis is that 
organizational control has been intensified since the launch of a 
conservative regime as a result of the change in internal organizational 
governance. Soejung Kim(2013. 7. 23.) calls for strenuous internal 
efforts, saying that people outside the MBC can take supportive actions 
only if resisting voices come out from within the MBC. This means 
that organizational control needs to be shattered first. The evaluation 
for general programming channels is the same. There are arguments 
that fairness of general programming channels have seriously been 
undermined with the influence of the owners of conservative 
newspapers. Many liberal scholars,11) who view general programming 
11) For example, Sanghyun Kang(2011) considers the birth of general 
programming channel as a tragedy that would destroy democracy in 
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channels as tools for strengthening conservative ideologies, interpret the 
birth of general programming channels as a phenomenon in which the 
press colludes with capital and get quasi-empowered. These liberal 
scholars see that the Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and Donga Ilbo, the 
three powers in the Korean newspaper market who entered the 
broadcasting market, are impairing broadcast fairness with 
sensationalism and partiality. These scholars do not specify on how the 
owners of the three news papers control their affiliated general 
programming channels at the organizational level. However, considering 
the characteristic of a private newspaper, which puts top priority on 
profit maximization, they assume that the fairness of a general 
programming channel as a broadcaster is vulnerable to damages by the 
mother company's economic interest and ideological tendency. 
   Then how does self-interested reporting appear at the organizational 
level in the Korean press? Let us take a concrete case. In general, 
media corporate self-interest works at the organizational level when the 
reported content is directly linked to the interest of the press(i.e., the 
status of the media, the owner's interest). Such behaviour includes: i) 
they cover favorable issues to their own company prominently, while 
Korean society. Namsuk Kim(2012) declares his support for the Unified 
Progressive Party and expresses his concern that there is no press with a 
midway stance. Seojung Kim(2012) also criticizes that general programming 
channel  indulge in impartial reporting practices, abandoning the principle 
of fairness. Jinbong Choi(2014) claims that general programming channel 
should be kicked out of the market and a parliamentary investigation and 
hearings need to be conducted in relation to the Channels.
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covering unfavorable issues to their company  inconspicuously or not 
covering at all; ii) they cover favorable issues to a rival company 
inconspicuously or do not cover at all, while covering unfavorable 
issues to the rival company prominently, iii) when a rival company 
covers offensive content about their company, they also do the same 
against the rival company. It is a kind of gate-keeping practice that a 
press organization hardly ever covers news report that criticizes its 
owner. It is a longstanding practice for a press organization that it 
does not provide unfavorable news coverage of its owner. 
   As one such example, Joongang Ilbo opened the top 10 list of 
privately owned houses with highest posted prices to the public on 
April 29, 2012 under the title of "Houses over 10 billion one appear 
in Seoul." Then it reported that the house of Mr. Sanghoon Bang, the 
owner of the Chosun Ilbo, located in Heukseok-Dong, Dongjak-Gu, 
turned out to be the most expensive house, the posted price of which 
went up 50.5% from last year. However, Chosun Ilbo, unlike Joongang 
Ilbo, did not cover the news. That is, while the news paper companies, 
the owner of which is not Mr. Bang, covered the news that could be 
burdensome to Mr. Bang, Chosun Ilbo did not mention it at all.
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<Figure 4> News Article: “Houses Priced Over 10 Billion Won Appear 
in Seoul... Housing Prices Up 10.7% in Yongsan“
Source : Joongang Ilbo, 2012. 4. 29
   On the contrary, Chosun Ilbo on May 5, 2012 reported that the 
Presidential Security Service(PSS) exchanged the house in 
Samchung-dong that Mr. Seokhyun Hong, Chairman of Joongang Ilbo, 
was awarded at a public auction in 2009,  with a state land belonging 
to the Security Office. However, this news article was not published in 
the Joongang Ilbo as well. It can be said that the two daily 
newspapers showed self-interested reporting practices by not covering 
the news that is not beneficial to the newspapers' owner. Self-interested 
reporting practices include detailed explanatory reporting about the 
suspicion over the company's owner. Joongang Ilbo reported on the 
suspicion in detail on May 5, 2012 that Chairman Hong exchanged 
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lands with the Blue House two days after the fact was reported in 
other newspapers. Joongang Ilbo explained in the social news page that 
the exchange of the land belonging to the Presidential Security Service 
with the Samchungjang in Samchung-Dong owned by Chairman of 
Joongang Ilbo was an equivalence exchange under the State Property 
Act. It also commented that the reason why Chairman Hong exchanged 
his land was that the Presidential Security Service raised an issue in 
relation to presidential escort service(Noh, 2012). 
<Figure 5> News Article: “The Blue House Exchanges a State Land 
Belonging to the Presidential Security Service with a Hanok in 
Samchung-dong Owned by Chairman Hong”
Source: Chosun Ilbo, 2012. 5. 5.
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   As seen so far, the press organizations show two types of 
responses in regards to a suspicion or criticism over the company's 
owner: i) do not cover the story, or ii) actively explain about the 
suspicion. It is because the owner has a substantial influence over the 
process of news gate-keeping. Other types of self-interested reporting 
can work advantageously for the company. Such reporting includes: 
representing the company's position unilaterally, presenting the 
company's unilateral position in the form of a news report, using news 
report for the publicity of the company's program; publicizing the 
company's events or the activities of the major shareholders or 
management(Broadcasting Journalist Association, 2012).  For example, 
media corporate self-interest can appear in relation to the advertiser by 
not criticizing the advertiser. This is because the press organization 
pursues profits(Broadcasting Journalist Association, 2014). Thus private 
broadcasters in particular, advertising makes up the majority of whose 
revenue, are never free from the influence of the advertiser.12) The 
more dependent on the advertising revenue a media company is, the 
harder it criticizes the advertiser. Therefore, media companies are eager 
to raise the ratings and increase advertising revenue by making up 
exciting and interesting content which can gain good viewership. 
   Media companies also make diverse efforts to maintain their 
relationship with the advertiser positively. One such effort is to restrain 
12) In the case of KBS, a public broadcaster, 60% of the revenue comes 
from advertising and 40% of the revenue comes from the license fee.
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itself from overly criticizing the advertiser. It is very important to 
secure advertising revenue without stepping on the toes of the 
advertiser. Swisher & Reese(1992) in the U. S. compared the coverage 
of the lobbying of the tobacco industry between the tobacco 
region(where tobacco is grown) and the non-tobacco region (where 
tobacco is not grown). The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency(EPA) announced in 1990 that passive cigarette smoking causes 
3,800 lung cancer deaths each year. The EPA organized a panel of 16 
experts for the review of the draft report related to the announcement. 
One of the experts was Dr. David Burns, who had conducted research 
on the harms of passive smoking for a long time. However, Dr. Burns 
was removed from the panel, because the Tobacco Institute, the U.S. 
tobacco industry's public relations arm, protested that Dr. Burns' 
involvement in the review of the EPA's report was not fair. What was 
intriguing about this incident was that the newspapers in the tobacco 
region and those in the non-tobacco region reported differently from 
each other about the reason for the exclusion of Dr. Burns from the 
panel. In the tobacco region, only two of the five headlines attributed 
the exclusion of Dr. Burns from the panel to tobacco industry 
lobbying. By comparison, in the non-tobacco region, six out of eight 
headlines attributed the removal of Dr. Burns from the panel to the 
result of the tobacco industry lobbying. Furthermore, the headlines of 






-Removal from EPA Cigarette Panel Linked to Tobacco Lobby
-Scientist Opposed by Bliley is Taken Off Smoking Panel
-Tobacco Lobbyists, Lawmaker Get Scientist Off EPA Panel
-Tobacco Backers Get Scientist Taken Off Panel on 
Second-Hand    Smoke
-Tobacco Lobbyists Triumph: “Anti-Smoking” Expert Removed    





-Passive Smoking Expert Forced Out
-Tobacco Industry Changes EPA Panel
-Tobacco Industry Lights a Fire under Scientist, EPA Dumps      
  Analyst from Panel Studying Passive Smoking
-Tobacco Industry’s Lobbying Gets Scientist Removed from EPA   
  Panel
-Lobbying Removes Scientist from Smoking Panel
-Panelist Removed after Lobbying by Tobacco Industry
-EPA Drops Smoking Expert
-Tobacco Lobby Ousts Scientist
attitude toward the tobacco industry(Swisher & Reese, 1992). In 
conclusion, the newspapers in the tobacco growing region, which had 
larger influence from the tobacco advertisers, tended not to criticize the 
tobacco industry, while the newspapers in the non-tobacco region, 
which had lesser influence from the tobacco advertisers, tended to 
criticize the tobacco industry.
<Table 1> Headlines for the Associated Press story on David Burns showing regional 
differences
Source: Swisher & Reese, 1992, p. 995 
   This study is a good example suggesting that the bigger portion of 
a media company's revenue an advertiser takes, the more self-interested 
reporting practices the company shows in relation to the advertiser's 
interests. There has been a criticism in Korea as well that the 
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newspapers do not criticize big advertisers, which means we can rarely 
see critical news articles about the companies that take the top of the 
list of advertising revenue. According to the industry estimates, the 
Samsung Group takes much more than 10% of the newspaper 
advertising revenue, while it takes only about 5% of the advertising 
space(Media Today, 2010. 2. 3.). When the Samsung Group stopped 
newspaper advertisement after the slush fund scandal in 2009, all 
newspapers started to defend the Samsung Group. The Hankyeorae, in 
which the Samsung Group fully stopped advertisement, was the only 
newspaper that carried a critical news article about the special pardon 
for Samsung Gourps' Chairman Lee. We can see a similar phenomenon 
related to apartment advertisements. The newspapers do not raise a 
voice of criticism about the real estate bubble, because apartment 
advertisements take a big portion of newspapers' revenue. There is a 
study that most of the newspapers represent the position of the 
management in relation to the strikes of the Hyundai Motor and Kia 
Motor mainly due to advertising revenue(Media Today, 2010. 2. 3). It 
is the reality of the media companies that they can not easily criticize 
the advertisers who take a big portion of their revenue.  This aspect is 
the main cause of slanted reporting biased with media corporate 
self-interest.
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2) Self-interested reporting on media policy issues
   Discussion on the media fairness has been mainly focused on the 
impartiality over socially controversial issues. Scholarly researches on 
media fairness show some characteristics as follows. The first 
characteristic of media fairness study is its analysis of the sub-elements 
of the concept of fairness. Scholars interpret 'fairness' as a concept that 
consists of appropriateness, balance, objectivity, neutrality(Golding, 
1983; Lim, 1993; McQuail, 1986; Rosengrin, 1980). The second 
characteristic is the discussion of for whom the so-called fairness 
function. Progressive scholars point out that fairness for a public 
broadcaster is to take side with the socially disadvantaged and air their 
position(Kang, 2004). They argue that such attitudes correspond with 
social justice and the spirit of the times. However, Yoo(2015) refutes 
the argument, saying that a public broadcaster should not ignore a 
minority view and position to be fair, but it does not necessarily mean 
that a public broadcaster must take side with the minority view and 
provide biased broadcasting(Youn, 2013; Lee, 2014). As mentioned 
earlier, existing studies on media fairness have focused on theoretical 
concepts or the issue of institutional governance. There has been a 
serious dearth of fairness study that addresses media corporate 
self-interest at the organizational level based on the interests of the 
owner or advertiser. Existing studies on media fairness have focused on 
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political variables and overlooked the economic aspect of a press 
organization and its owner. According to <2012 News consumer 
perception survey> conducted by the Korea Press Foundation, 79.5% of 
the respondents took media corporate self-interest as the first reason for 
the decrease of fairness and credibility of news reporting (Journalist 
Association of Korea, 2015. 1. 14.). This is why proper regulation over 
self-interested reporting is necessary in order to enhance fairness of the 
press. The problem here is that proper regulation over media’s 
self-interested reporting seems somewhat abstractive. Therefore this 
study focuses on how media corporate self-interest plays role in 
reporting news on broadcasting policy related issues. As mentioned 
earlier, media policy is regarded very crucial and influential to media 
business. By examining the role of media corporate self-interest, this 
paper will figure out how news about policy related issues has been 
formed.     
   What should be noted about the cases considered above is that as 
with the newspapers, which are assumed to be under the strong control 
of the owner, the broadcasters as well take a completely egoistic 
attitude when covering media policies that are related to their interests. 
There appears not much difference between public broadcasters and 
private ones in terms of self-interested reporting practices.13) 
13) Besides the cases discussed in the earlier section, other such example is 
as follows: A KBS news report on March 23, 2015 bluntly emphasized 
the necessity of the raise of the license fee and the adoption of the 
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Particularly, more expanded, watered-down, or omitted reporting are 
spotted in relation to media policy issues, which are more closely 
intertwined with the interests of broadcasting companies. Broadcasting 
firms tend to display self-interested reporting practices much more, 
when a policy can directly affect the competitive relationship among 
them. This tendency will be strengthened, as public regulation over 
broadcasting in general becomes increasingly relaxed and competition in 
the broadcasting industry becomes increasingly intensified, as a result 
of the changes in the media environment. A favorable media policy is 
an essential element for the success in media business. Even if a 
media company is highly competitive in the market, it cannot help but 
face limits to growth when government media policies are in conflict 
with its business interests. This is one of the main reasons why 
broadcasting firms show self-interested reporting practices over media 
policies, which are closely related to their business interests. With their 
biased news reports tailored toward their corporate self-interest, they 
attempt to exert their influences on public discussions of certain media 
policies in order to survive or flourish as a corporation in the 
market.14) As discussed earlier, biased self-interested reporting, 
advertising regulation for total amount under the headline of "53.4% of the 
population support the advertising regulation for total amount." 
14) Recently, Donga Ilbo published a boxed article under the headline of 
"KBS that covets even mid-program ads"(Dongailbo, 2015. 4. 27.). It 
harshly criticized the KBS that it revealed its regret over the failure of the 
passage of a legislation that would permit the terrestrial broadcasters to 
carry  mid-program ads when delivering the news about the adoption of 
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particularly related to media policies, could seriously harm broadcast 
fairness, which is an essential element for maintaining a democratic 
society.
   This is why systematic research on self-interested reporting by 
broadcasting firms is needed. However, there is a serious dearth of 
analytical scholarly research on this issue. The existing studies on 
broadcasters' self interested reporting display several characteristics. 
Most notably, they simply describe how terrestrial broadcasters pursue 
their interests utilizing their own news sections. One of the 
studies(Moon, 2012) described the cases of broadcasters' self interested 
reporting practices and other one(Broadcasting Journalist Association, 
2014) suggested a list of check points for the prevention of self 
interested reporting by broadcasting firms. However, they cannot be 
considered as systematic research on media’s self-interested reporting in 
that they simply described problematic practices of self-interested 
reporting or suggested check points to prevent such practices without 
offering any theoretical explanations for the phenomena or exploring 
them using any systematic research method. 
the gross cap regulation of advertising time, even though it promises to 
reduce the amount of advertising for the public as a public broadcaster.
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Chapter 3. Research Model and Hypotheses 
3-1. Research Model
   This section explains about the research model. The details of the 
context and background of the two media policies chosen for the 
study(the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
broadcasters and re-approval of general programming channels) are 
described below. 
<Figure 6> Research Model
  The research model above is designed to explain how media 
corporate  self-interest affect biased news reporting. This model 
explains what this study is about and how research hypotheses are 
deducted for analysis. 
   The first square of the model is about the factors generating a 
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media firm's self-interest. There are several factors, such as 
organizational and economic factors, which generate corporate 
self-interest. Here, the independent variable is media corporate 
self-interest and the dependent variable is biased reporting. The study 
assumes that a media firm’s self-interest should affect its news report, 
resulting in biased reporting, that is, self-interested reporting. The study 
also assumes that  self-interested reporting related to media policies 
appears in two different aspects: i) if the concerned policy is favorable 
to a media firm's interest, it will reports positively on the policy; ii) if 
the concerned policy is favorable to a rival firm's interest and 
unfavorable to the media firm's interest, it will negatively report on the 
policy. In the same context, the study assumes that both major 
terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels are likely 
to report biased news in line with their self-interest. This is expected 
to be particularly so when the media policies covered in the news 
report are related to their economic profitability. 
   More concretely speaking, the study assumes that media firms are 
likely to report less news if the news hinders their profitability. The 
policy of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
broadcasters allows terrestrial TV broadcasters to allocate advertising 
time more efficiently than they used to do, therefore could increase 
their profitability. However, the policy may work unfavorably to 
general programming channels, because the broadcast advertising market 
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is limited and they need to fiercely compete with terrestrial 
broadcasters to obtain advertising. This implies that advantageous policy 
to terrestrial TV broadcasters can be disadvantageous to general 
programming channels. 
   The study hypothesizes that terrestrial TV broadcasters used more 
news sources/interviewees who support the gross cap regulation of 
advertising time than general programming channels did. In the same 
sense, terrestrial broadcasters are believed to use more chroma-keys or 
longer comments of the side that support the gross cap regulation of 
advertising time than general programming channels did. By the same 
logic, it is assumed in this study that general programming channels 
were more likely to use more news sources/interviewees who support 
re-approval of their channels than terrestrial broadcasters did. General 
programming channels are also believed to use more chroma-keys or 
longer comments of the side that support re-approval of their channels 
than terrestrial TV broadcasters did.  
   Furthermore, this study infers that terrestrial TV broadcasters are 
likely to report less amount of news that criticize the KCC than 
general programming channels did, during the period when they 
covered the debates around the gross cap regulation of advertising time 
for terrestrial broadcasters. In other words, during the period, terrestrial 
broadcasters are believed to use less amount of 
comments/sources/chroma-keys that criticize the KCC than general 
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programming channels did. In the same sense, it is assumed that the 
length of broadcasters' comments that criticize the KCC is likely to be 
shorter than those of general programming channels. By the same 
logic, this study infers that general programming channels are likely to 
report less amount of news that criticiz the KCC than terrestrial 
broadcasters did during the period when they covered the debates 
around re-approval of general programming channels.  General 
programming channels are also believed to use less amount of 
comments/sources/chroma-keys that criticize the KCC than terrestrial 
TV broadcasters did during the period. It is also believed that general 
programming channels used shorter comments on average that criticize 
the KCC during the period than terrestrial broadcasters did.  
   This study seeks to develop quality index of biased report. The 
quality index measures which broadcast companies aired more 
factually-based news reports despite the potential for biased reporting 
derived from corporate self-interest. If a news report was more 
factually based, it earned a higher quality index score than a less 
factually-based news report. From a common sense perspective, the 
study assumes that a public terrestrial broadcaster is likely to score a 
higher quality index than that of a general programming channel, 
which has more concern about economic profitability. Based on the 
assumed relationship between variables considered so far, the following 
hypotheses are generated.  
- 44 -
3-2. Analyzing Cases
   To test the hypotheses, news reports by terrestrial broadcasters and 
general programming channels on the following two media policies will 
be analyzed: i) the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters, and ii) re-approval of general programming 
channels. These two representative media policies on which the 
interests of major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming 
channels clearly conflict. 
   As mentioned earlier, there is a dearth of analytical studies that 
deal with the issue of broadcast firms' self-interested reporting. Most of 
the existing researches simply describe how the broadcasters pursue 
their interests utilizing their own news sections, and how the news 
reporting aiming to promote corporate self-interest prevails in the 
broadcasting sphere. These researches do not really explore the 
mechanism in which self-interested reporting occurs. Taking an 
analytical approach on the phenomenon, this study seeks to investigate 
the mechanism in which self-interested news reporting takes place in 
broadcasting arena, particularly concerning media policy issues. More 
specifically, the study will investigate how two rival groups of 
broadcasting organizations deal with media policy issues, on which 
each group has different interests, in their news reports. For the 
investigation, the study will compare self-interested reporting behavior 
of the  major terrestrial broadcasters(SBS, MBC, KBS) and general 
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programming channels(TV Chosun, MBN, Channel A, JTBC),15) given 
that the two groups have conflicting interests in regards to certain 
media policy issues. This study assumes that the two groups of 
broadcasting firms will report on these policies differently from each 
other in line with their self-interest.         Furthermore, since the 
two of the major newspapers(the Chosun Ilbo and Joongang Ilbo) are 
under the same ownership with the two of general programming 
channels(JTBC and TV Chosun) respectively, the two newspapers'  
reporting behavior will also be included for the analysis.
1) The gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters(GCRAT)
  The gross cap regulation of advertising time is a regulation that 
limits the total allowance of broadcast advertising time while allowing 
a broadcasting company to freely determine the method to put 
advertising, such as allocation time, numbers, and advertising types. 
Since the government only limits the total allowance of advertising 
time, a broadcasting company has benefit of having flexibility to 
allocate more advertising in a prime-time (for example, putting multiple 
advertising through mid-show). This regulation, which had been allowed 
only for pay-TV channels, began to be applied to terrestial broadcasters 
15) Major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels show 
distinctively different interests on several matters.
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with the amendment of the Enforcement Ordinance of the Broadcasting 
Act in April, 2015. With the adoption of the gross cap regulation of 
advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, terrestrial broadcasting 
companies can determine the method of allocating advertising more 
flexibly than before as long as the time  don’t exceed the total 
allowance level. With this regulation being adopted, terrestrial 
broadcasters can have much more latitude in allocating advertising in 
the prime time segments(and possibly more commercial gains).16) 
Throughout the period  during which public debates around the 
adoption of the policy took place, terrestrial broadcasters and general 
programming channels showed contrasting reactions to the regulation 
proposal in line with their expected business interests related to the 
policy.
16) However, advertising revenue boosting effect for terrestrial broadcasters 
through this regulation are limited, since mid-program advertising is yet 




-Deepening the gap between the have and the have-nots
-Negatively affecting media diversity
-Tarnishing the role of public broadcasting
Reasons For 
the Policy
-Affordable revenue for quality content production
-Global trend (relaxed regulation)
<Table 2> Reasons for opposing/supporting GCRAT
[Hypothesis 1] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to report news 
that supports the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
broadcasters than general programming channels do.
[1-1] Terrestrial broadcasters are likely to air more comments 
supporting the gross cap regulation of advertising time than 
general programming channels do. 
[1-2] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to use sources that 
support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general 
programming channels do. 
[1-3] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to use interviewees/panels 
who support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than 
general programming channels do. 
[1-4] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to use chroma-keys that 
support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general 
programming channels do. 
[1-5] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to report on average 
longer comments of the side that supports the gross cap 
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regulation of advertising time than general programming channels 
do. 
2) Re-approval of general programming channels(RAGPC)
   General programming channels have to acquire re-approval by the 
government every three years. The government institution in charge of 
this process is the Korea Communications Commission(KCC). The 
Broadcasting Appraisal committee within the KCC determines on 
whether to re-approve a general programming channel in accordance 
with the following standards: broadcasting evaluation 350 points; public 
accountability of broadcasting(public responsibility, fairness, feasibility 
of the fulfillment of the public interest, protection of viewers' rights) 
230 points; the appropriateness of planning,  programming, and 
production plans of broadcasting programs 160 points; financial and 
technical capability 80 points; the appropriateness of institutional and 
human management plans 60 points; Funding plans for the development 
of broadcasting and their execution 30 points; contribution to the 
development of local society, validity for local·social·cultural needs 20 
points; compliance with the requirements for broadcasters at the time 
of approval 70 points, the number of correction orders and the number 
of non-compliance with correction orders. The total points are 1000 
and general programming channels have to receive over 650 points in 
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order to get  re-approval by the KCC. During the last re-approval 
period in March 2014, all of the channels met up to the 
requirement(JTBC 727.01; TV Chosun 684.73; Channel A 684.66; 
MBN 690). Re-approval of general programming channels is not quite 
much directly related to the interest of terrestrial broadcasters. 
Realistically, the re-approval system is not so much about cancelling 
the channels' license but more about making them motivated to keep 
their promise they made at the launch of the channels. In other words, 
the KCC uses the “re-approval system” as a means to keep the 
channels in check.17)    
   Although re-approval of general programming channels do not 
actually have significant effect on major terrestrial broadcasters’ 
business interests, it may be assumed that terrestrial broadcasters still 
do not view it positively. Since general programming channels are 
considered “rivals” to major terrestrial broadcasters, this study 
hypothesizes that major terrestrial broadcasters, at least, do not 
encourage re-approval of general programming channels, even though it 
is unrealistic for general programming channels to ever be kicked out 
of the broadcasting market.
   For general programming channels, the evaluation period for 
17) The KCC ordered TV Chosun and Channel A to improve their “biased” 
reporting and for JTBC to improve its financial management. The KCC 
also demanded TV Chosun and Channel A for “diverse and harmonious 
TV programs”(to cut back on news program allocation ratio) (KCC press 
release, 2015. 6. 4.).
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re-approval is very important and they are known to react very 
sensitively to any point deduction. For instance, recently the KCC 
pushed ahead with doubling the penalty for TV programs deemed unfit 
for broadcasting, and general programming channels reacted very 
seriously to that. General programming channels opposed such a plan, 
stating that “general programming channels can fail to reach the 
standard 650 points just because of one or two points. It is very unfair 
to double the penalty and if the government pushes ahead with this 
plan, general programming channels will only come up with TV 
programs that they think are in line with the government’s preference. 
This is not democracy"(DongA.com, 2015. 10. 26.). 
   Theories explaining the varying relationship between media firms 
and the regulators, such as the KCC, are rare.  Nonetheless, a 
mechanism that is similar to 'revolving-door hypothesis' can be used to 
expect a plausible relationship between media firms and regulators. The 
'revolving door' refers to the phenomenon between regulators and the 
industries that "industry...hires people out of government positions to 
gain personal access to government officials, seek favorable 
legislation/regulation and government contracts in exchange for 
high-paying employment offers..."18) The revolving-door hypothesis' 
assumes that government officials try to have positive relationship with 
18) Revolving door (Politics),  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolving_door_(politics) (last visited June 15, 
2016)
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the firms, where their future jobs may be available. The logic can be 
applied to the relationship between the media firms and the 
government regulator, such as the KCC. Especially durng the period 
when media firms apply for re-approval from the KCC, it may be 
assumed that they are likely to air less news reports which criticize 
the KCC in order not to offend the policy decision makers in it.  
   In sum, media policies directly/indirectly affect press organizations' 
reporting behavior. The gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters  is favorable policy for major terrestrial 
broadcasters, while definitely not so for general programming channels. 
In this case, the study assumes that the two groups of broadcasters 
behave differently. First, if a media policy is favorable to one's own 
company, the company comments on it positively and reports on it 
regularly so as to make public opinion favorable to them. Second, if a 
media policy is not favorable to one's own company(but favorable to 
the rival  company) the company will criticize the policy or not report 
on it at all.  In other words, media firms are likely to try to set an 
“agenda” depending on the nature of a policy, by avoiding conflicts 
with regulators such as the KCC, especially when there is interest 
based on relationship with the regulators.
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[Hypothesis 2] General programming channels are more likely to report 
news that supports re-approval of general programming channels than 
terrestrial broadcasters do.
[2-1] The reporters/anchors/MCs of general programming channels are 
more likely to make more comments supporting re-approval of 
general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do. 
[2-2] General programming channels are more likely to use sources 
that support re-approval of general programming channels than 
terrestrial broadcasters do. 
[2-3] General programming channels are more likely to use 
interviewees/panels who support re-approval of general 
programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.  
[2-4] General programming channels are more likely to use 
chroma-keys that support re-approval of general programming 
channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.
[2-5] General programming channels are more likely to report on 
average longer comments of the side that supports re-approval of 
general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do. 
Moreover, this study will examine whether broadcasters display 
self-interested reporting behavior regarding the KCC when there is an 
interest at stake (e.g., whether KBS behaves 'nicer' to the KCC during 
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the debating period for the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters)
[Hypothesis 3] Terrestrial broadcasters are less likely to report news 
that criticizes the KCC during the period when the debates around the 
adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestial 
broadcasters took place. 
[3-1] KBS’ reporters/anchors/MCs are likely to make less comments 
criticizing the KCC than TV Chosun does during the period 
when the debates around the adoption of the gross cap 
regulation of advertising time for terrestial broadcasters took 
place. 
[3-2] KBS is less likely to use sources that criticize the KCC than TV 
Chosun does during the period when the debates around the 
adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestial broadcasters took place. 
[3-3] KBS is less likely to use interviewees/panels who criticize the 
KCC than TV Chosun does during the period when the debates 
around the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising 
time for terrestial broadcasters took place. 
[3-4] KBS is less likely to use chroma-keys that criticize the KCC 
than TV Chosun does during the period when the debates around 
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the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestial broadcasters took place. 
[3-5] KBS is likely to report on average shorter on comments of the 
side that criticizes KCC than TV Chosun does during the period 
when the debates around the adoption of the gross cap regulation 
of advertising time for terrestial broadcasters took place. 
[Hypothesis 4] General programming channels are less likely to report 
news that criticizes the KCC during an appraisal period for re-approval 
of general programming channels. 
[4-1] TV Chosun’s reporters/anchors/MCs are likely to make less 
comments criticizing the KCC than KBS does during an appraisal 
period for re-approval of general programming channels. \
[4-2] TV Chosun is less likely to use sources that criticize the KCC 
than KBS does during an appraisal period for re-approval of 
general programming channels. 
[4-3] TV Chosun is less likely to use interviewees/panels that criticize 
the KCC than KBS does during an appraisal period for 
re-approval of general programming channels. 
[4-4] TV Chosun is less likely to use chroma-keys that criticize the 
KCC than KBS does during an appraisal period for re-approval of 
general programming channels. 
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[4-5] TV Chosun is likely to report on average shorter on comments 
of the side that criticizes KCC than TV Chosun does during an 
appraisal period for re-approval of general programming channels. 
Last but not least, the study will review the quality of “biased 
reporting” using biased index created in this study.
[Hypothesis 5] A terrestrial broadcaster is more likely to get higher 
scores on the “quality index” than a general programming channel 
does. 
[5-1] KBS is more likely to get higher scores on the “quality index” 
than a general programming channel (JTBC) does. 
   In short, the hypotheses in this study were created to examine 
whether a a broadcast news report is a news biased with corporate 
self-interest(self-interested news report) by assessing both quantitative 
indicators (e.g., the length of comments, the number of comments, 
sources, chroma-keys and interviewees/panels) and qualitative indicators 
(e.g., more factually-based news reports, less-factually-based news 
reports). The study expects that through an examination of biased news 
reporting with both quantitative and qualitative indicators, it will better 
figure out the relationship between media corporate self-interest and 
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self-interested reporting behavior, particularly related to media policy 
issues.
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Chapter 4. Research Method
   This chapter offers explanations about the subjects of analysis and 
the sampling Tables. Then, the chapter considers the coding method 
used to check the hypotheses. 
4-1. Subjects of analysis
   This study examines how terrestrial TV broadcasters, general 
programming channels and newspapers to which general programming 
channels are affiliated report news related to two media policies: the 
gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters and 
re-approval of general programming channels. News items, which dealt 
with the two media policies between one year before and four months 
after the announcement of a relevant policy, were reviewed.19)  
   In this vein, i) in regards to the gross cap regulation of advertising 
time for terrestrial broadcasters, the subjects for analysis include 
relevant news reports by three terrestrial broadcasters(KBS, MBC, 
SBS), four general programming channels(TV Chosun, JTBC, MBN, 
Channel A) and two newspapers(Chosun Ilbo,  Joongang Ilbo) between 
19) The period for the selection of news items seem somewhat arbitrary. 
However, this study assumes that the selected periods for news items 
allow us to assess the attitudinal change of media firms in regards to a 
regulator or regulatory policy.
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one year before and four months after the KCC's decision on the 
adoption of the regulation(2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14). (ii) In regards to 
re-approval of general programming channels, the subjects of analysis 
include relevant news reports by three terrestrial broadcasters(KBS, 
MBC, SBS), four general programming channels(TV Chosun, JTBC, 
MBN, Channel A) and two newspapers(Chosun Ilbo,  Joongang Ilbo) 
between one year before and four months after the KCC's evaluation 
of general programming channels for re-approval(2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 
13). The news items were collected from the homepage of the 
broadcasters and newspapers.20) 
   This study also reviews reporting behavior of a media firm related 
to the KCC when debates around a certain policy at which the media 
firm's interest at stake, took place. The study assumes that a media 
firm is likely to demonstrate different reporting behaviors when there is 
an interest at stake and there is not. For instance, the study 
hypothesizes terrestrial TV broadcasters are not likely to report news 
that criticizes the KCC during the period when debates around the 
gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took 
place. Hereinafter, 'GCRAT period' refers to the period when debates 
around the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
20)KBS(http://www.kbs.co.kr/), MBC(http://www.imbc.com/), 
SBS(http://www.sbs.co.kr/), TV Chosun(http://www.tvchosun.com/main.html), 
MBN(http://mbn.mk.co.kr/), Channel A(http://www.ichannela.com/), 
JTBC(http://jtbc.joins.com/), Joongang Ilbo(http://joongang.joins.com/), 
Chosun Ilbo(http://www.chosun.com/)
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During the period of 
debates around the 
gross cap regulation 




(2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14) 
1. Right to be forgotten
2. 700Mhz
3. Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act
4. Creative economy
5. Personal information protection
6. Mobile phone subsidies
7. KBS license fee
8. Uber
9. Crisis of the Korean wave content 
10. KBS hearings






(2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13)
1. Disaster broadcasting
2. Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act
3. Hacking
4. Reply comments by the National 
Intelligence Service 
5. Personal Information Protection
6. Digital free universal service
7. KBS license fee
8. UHD TV
9. Retaking-off of the Korean wave 
10. KCC chairman confirmation hearings
broadcasters took place. 'RAGPC period' refers to the period when 
debates around re-approval of general programming channels took 
place. For relevant investigation, the study chose 10  controversial 
policy issues related to the KCC for both above mentioned 
periods(2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13; 2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14) 
respectively. 
<Table 3> The 10 controversial policy issues related to the KCC
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   For data collection, the coders searched news reports, which were 
related to each of the 10 controversial policy issues and aired/published 
during the 'GCRAT period' (2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14) and RAGPC 
period(2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13) respectively, using various relevant 
key words. The reason for choosing 10 issues for analysis was because 
there were too many news reports about the KCC for the both periods, 
and it was almost impossible and inefficient to review all of them. For 
the same reason, the study examined the reporting behavior of KBS(as 
a terrestrial broadcaster), TV Chosun(as a general programming 
channel) and Chosun Ilbo(as a sister newspaper company to TV 
Chosun).21) 
21) Conventionally, it is not really necessary to review the three terrestrial 
broadcasters and the four general programming channels. KBS, a public 
broadcaster, depends 60% of its revenues on advertising. The dependency 
of both MBC and SBS on advertising is much higher than that of KBS, 
which receives the license fee. General programming channels depend 
100% of its revenues on advertising. In this respect, it must be fair to 
choose KBS as a terrestrial broadcaster for analysis in that KBS and a 
general programming channel are likely show much different behaviors 
from each other. TV Chosun was chosen for analysis, out of the four 
general programming channels, on the ground that it can be considered a 
major general programming channel relatively highly focusing on news 
reporting. Chosun Ilbo was selected for analysis mainly in that it is one of 
























































<Table 4> The number of news items related to GCRAT (2014. 7. 
14.~2015. 11. 14) 










Right to be Forgotten 2 2 7
700 Mhz 7 3 7
Mobile Device Distribution 
Improvement Act
16 2 130







KBS license fee 2 1 2
Uber 2 1 13
Crisis of the Korean 
wave content 
2 1 2
KBS hearings 7 9 3
<Table 6> The number of news items related to the KCC 









Disaster broadcast 2 2 7
Mobile Device Distribution 
Improvement Act
7 3 7
Hacking 16 2 130










KBS license fee 2 1 2
UHD TV 2 1 13






<Table 7> The number of news items related to the KCC 
during the RAGPC period (2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13)
4-2. Coding 
   This study analyzes news bias in two dimensions. First, it looks at 
how much biased the news reports of terrestrial broadcasters and 
general programming channels/newspapers are by looking at various 
quantitative indicators. For instance, the number of supporters/dissenters 
for/against an issue, the average length of the comments by both sides 
is counted, along with the number of chroma-keys used in the news 
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reports. Through looking at the balance of characters used in the news 
reports and other quantitative indicators, this study seeks to verify the 
first group of hypotheses. Second, the study analyzes the quality of 
bias of the news reports of terrestrial broadcasters and general 
programming channels/newspapers. While the first dimension of  
analysis(quantitative analysis) concerns how the two broadcasting 
groups(terrestrial broadcasters & general programming channels) differ 
in their inclination (in terms of whether they oppose or support the 
concerned issue), the second dimension of analysis(qualitative analysis) 
concerns which of the two broadcasting groups display a better quality 
in their news reporting. Throughout the second part of analysis, this 
study acknowledges that news reports by both broadcasting groups are 
biased. However, even though they are biased, there may be a 
difference in the quality of their biased news reporting. In other words, 
even if a news report is favoring one side, if those comments in the 
news report is factually-based, the news report can be considered better 
in quality than the news report depending on less factually-based 
comments. The latter could be considered just an activism with lower 
reliability and persuasiveness. To compare the quality of biased news 
reports of terrestrial broadcasters and general programming 
channels/newspapers, the study uses the “quality index” which is 
specifically created in this study. Through the quality index, 
Hypotheses 2 will be verified.
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1) Quantitative bias
    To quantitatively assess the degree of bias in a news report, this 
study divides the characters in a news report into three groups. First 
group is for anchors/reporters. Second group is for news sources. Third 
group is for interviewees/panels.22) For the first 
group(anchors/reporters), the study examines how much personal 
opinion23) of the anchormen/reporters/correspondents was included in 
the news report(percentage out of the total news length). The coders 
determine if that personal opinion is for/against the issue (it wouldn’t 
be neutral because then it would not be much of a personal opinion; it 
would be either side of the two). Moreover, the study looks at what 
kind of inclination indicators the first group used for his/her personal 
opinion. According to Yoon(2007), a news presenter suggests his/her 
opinion in a various ways. These ways include: 1) using personal 
opinion, 2) using embellished language, 3) using a historical example, 
4) using specific facial expressions, 5) proposing a moral value, 6) 
22) As qualitative inclination indicators for a news report, this study attempts 
to table out the balance of characters used in the news. Won & 
Yun(2015) stated that for a fair journalism, a news report must include 
various sources and interviewees/panels to provide diverse perspectives for 
the viewers. Lee & Kim(2008) also stated that for a news report to be 
impartial, inclusion of diverse perspectives, opinions, and statements is 
necessary. In order to achieve this, one ways is using different 
sources(Entman, 1985). 
23) Speaking not a fact but a subjective opinion.
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Using personal opinion(when a news anchor/reporter 




Using specific facial expressions
Proposing a moral value(when a news anchor/reporter 
suggests his/her opinion on the direction of a policy)
Quoting someone else
quoting someone else. Thus, the study consulted with Yoon's research 
for reference and used these standards to look at what kind of 
inclination indicators the news presenter used. 
<Table 8> The types of opinion intervention by news anchors/reporters 
   Then, the study looks at how many sources the news used for each 
respective issue’s supporter or/and dissenter. For instance, for one KBS 
news item related to the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters, two supporters were used as news sources while 
zero dissenters were used as news sources(implying KBS’ bias on the 
issue). The study also reviewed how many 
interviewees/panels/commentators were used in the news for both 
sides(supporting and dissenting). Not only that, the coders left a note 
on who the interviewees and panels were(ex. a professor, a KCC staff 
member, etc.) 
   The use of chroma-key was also examined to look for quantitative 
bias of the news. The coders reviewed whether a chroma key was 
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used or not. If a  chroma key was used, the coders left a comment 
on what the chroma key referred to, whether the chroma-key was 
relevant to the issue, and whether it was favorable or unfavorable to 
the issue. Finally, the coders quantified the total length of comments 
of the consenting side and dissenting side (in seconds). In verifying 
hypotheses, average length of the comments of both consenting and 
dissenting sides were used.
2) Quality index 24)
To assess the quality of a biased news report, this study uses the 
following index.
24) For qualitative bias, this study examines the bias of comments. 
Garsten(2008) stated that rhetorics do not always have to rational because 
a ‘good message’ sometimes appeals to emotion, even biased remarks can 
help achieve democratic deliberation. However, considering the fact that  
factitious rhetoric, such as appealing to emotion and bias, has significant 
effect in election campaigning, it is not desirable to reveal bias for public 
policies that require fairness(Collins, 2004; Dellavigna & Kaplan, 2006; 
Morris, 2005).
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1. Real reportage (account of what happened approximated 
to the incident)
2. Facts + Analysis
3. Facts + Reflection of each side’s position in a balanced  
    way
4. Facts + Support for the gross cap regulation of       
   advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters/          
   re-approval of general programming channels
5. Facts + Objecting to the gross cap regulation of       
   advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters/          
   re-approval of general programming channels
6. Factas + Support for the KCC
7. Fact + Objection to the KCC
8. Balanced attitude without factual report
9. Support for the gross cap regulation of advertising    
   time for terrestrial broadcasters/re-approval of        
   general programming channels without factual report
10. Objection to the gross cap regulation of advertising  
    time for terrestrial broadcasters/re-approval of       
    general programming channels without factual report
11. Support for the KCC without factual report
12. Objection to the KCC without factual report
13. Other remarks with/without factual report
<Table 9> Quality Index
1, 2, 3, 8, 13 = 0 : non-biased reporting → neutral/null
4, 5, 6, 7 = +1   : more factually-based biased reporting → high quality 
biased reporting
9, 10, 11, 12= -1  : less factually-based biased reporting →low quality 
biased reporting 
   
   To measure the quality of bias, the coders watch the news clips 
and write the corresponding numbers for the news report. For each 
news report, the numbers can be multiple because each news report is 
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composed of multiple comments and those comments can differ (one 
comment can be 2, the other can be 4, and so on). 
   Then the study looks specifically into whether the news items have 
elements of 4, 5, 6, and 7, thus scored '+1', which refers to 'high 
quality bias',  or 9, 10, 11, and 12, thus scored '-1', which refers to 
'low quality bias'.  To assess the level of bias quality for a news 
report as a whole, each score with '+1' value (which is 4, 5, 6, and 7) 
will be multiplied by the length of respective comment and added 
together. Then, the score is divided by the whole score ('high quality 
comment score x length of the comment' + 'low quality comment score 
x length of the comment'). Then, the final score will come out 
between '–1' and '+1'. If the final score is closer to '+1', it means that 
the news report was more factually-based biased report as a whole, 
which could be interpreted as a high quality biased report; Meanwhile, 
if the final score is closer to –1, it means that the news report was 
less factually-based biased report as a whole, which can be interpreted 
as a low quality biased report. The elements of 1, 2, 3, 8, and 13 
indicate neutral dispositions, which would not be meaningful for this 
study.




   Two coders participated in the coding work for this study. They 
each reviewed 30 identical news items in the pilot test. The inter-coder 
reliability was verified to be more than 95% and thus was deemed to 
be fit for the research. The coders coded news items based on the 











5-1. Outcome for the 'gross cap regulation of 
advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters 
(GCRAT)' (2014. 7. 14 ~ 2015. 11. 14)
   In this section, both descriptive results and hypothesis verification 
results for Hypothesis 1(Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to 
report news that supports the gross cap regulation of advertising time 
for terrestrial broadcasters(GCRAT) than general programming channels 
do) will be provided.
Descriptive Results
<Table 10> The order of news items related to GCRAT 
   First, the order of news items arranged within a news program 
were looked at. The order is categorized into three levels depending in 
which time segment the news item appeared. If it appeared in the 
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beginning segment (the 30% time segment from the start of the 
program) of the whole news program, then it was categorized into the 
'beginning'. If it appeared in the middle segment (the middle 30-70% 
time segment), then categorized into the 'middle'. if it appeared in the 
ending segment(the 30% time segment toward the end of the program), 
then categorized into the 'end'. Table 10 shows that 20 of the 
terrestrial broadcast news items were put in the beginning segment, 
while 16 were in the middle segment. Only 3 were put in the ending 
segment. Compared to that, 15 of general programming channel news 
items were put in the ending segment, while only 2 and 5 were put in 
the beginning and middle segments  respectively. This can be 
interpreted that terrestrial broadcasters put more importance in reporting 
about the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
broadcasters in that most of the news items related to the regulation 
were put in the beginning or middle segments. 
   The news items were collected from the three terrestrial TV 
broadcasters (KBS, SBS, MBC), four general programming channels(TV 
Chosun, Channel A, MBN, JTBC), and two newspapers(Joongang Ilbo, 
Chosun Ilbo).  The average length of the news items from the three 
terrestrial broadcasters was 105 seconds; 100 seconds for those from 
the four general programming channels, and 1,059 words for those 
from the two newspapers.  The average proportions of subjective 
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<Table 11> Summary of descriptive results for Hypothesis 1
   
   Among the three terrestrial broadcasters, MBC had the highest 
subjective comment rate, which can be interpreted as 'opinion 
intervention rate', and among the four general programming channels, 
MBN had the highest subjective comment rate. Joongang Ilbo and 
Chosun Ilbo showed relatively high subjective comment rates, which 
were 20% and 15% respectively. The types of news reporter’s opinion 
intervention also varied between terrestrial TV broadcasters and general 
programming channels. For the terrestrial TV broadcasters, mostly 
quoting or embellished comments or statistics were used. For general 
programming channels, there were a lot of quoting, historical examples, 
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and specific facial expressions. 
   <Table 11> demonstrates that terrestrial TV broadcasters and 
general programming channels, along with newspapers, show very 
different reporting behaviors from another: terrestrial broadcasters used 
a lot more sources that favor the gross cap regulation of advertising 
time for terrestrial broadcasters, while general programming channels 
and newspapers were the opposite. <Table 11> also indicates that 
terrestrial broadcasters featured longer on the comments that supported 
the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, 
while general programming channels did the opposite.
   Both terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels 
used chroma-keys most of the time; terrestrial broadcasters used 
chroma-keys that favored the policy, while general programming 












Total 22 39 61
Hypothesis Test Results
<Table 12> Results for Hypothesis 1-1
*p<0.05
   
   Hypothesis 1-1 is supported(p<0.05, x2=19.411).  As shown in 
<Table 12>, terrestrial TV broadcasters made 22 comments (by 
reporters/anchors/MCs) supporting the gross cap regulation of 
advertising time for terrestial braodcasters.  On the other hand, general 
programming channels did not make any comments that supported the 
regulation.  The difference between the two broadcasting corporation 
groups is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05. 
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<Table 13> Results for Hypothesis 1-2
*p<0.05
   Hypothesis 1-2 is supported(p<0.05, t=2.874, df=59, st.dv=1.47). As 
shown in <Table 13>, the number of supporting sources for the gross 
cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters used by 
terrestrial TV broadcasters (mean=1.79) is bigger than that of general 
programming channels (mean=.31). The difference between them is 
statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05. 












Total 34 27 61
   Hypothesis 1-3 is supported(p<0.05, t=4.56, df=59, st.dv=.18). As 
shown in <Table 14>, the number of supporting interviewees/panels for 
GCRAT (mean=1.30) used by the terrestrial TV broadcasters is bigger 
than that (mean=.31) of general programming channel. The difference 
between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of 
0.05.
<Table 15> Results for Hypothesis 1-4
*p<0.05
   Hypothesis 1-4 is supported(p<0.05, x2=36.552). As shown in 
<Table 15> above, terrestrial TV broadcasters used 33 chroma-keys 
supporting the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
broadcasters. The number of chroma-keys that do not support the 
regulation is 6.  On the other hand, general programming channels are 
reported to use one chroma-key supporting the regulation. On the other 
hand, the number of chroma-keys that do not support the regulation is 
21.  The difference between terrestial TV broadcasters and general 
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Avg Comment Length of 









programming channels is statistically meaningful at the probability level 
of .05. 
<Table 16> Results for Hypothesis 1-5
*p<0.05
   Hypothesis 1-5 is supported(p<0.05, t=11.48, df=49, st.dv=16.61). 
As shown in <Table 16>, the average length of comments supporting 
GCRAT (mean=19.21) used by terrestrial TV broadcasters is longer 
than that of general programming channels (mean=2.59). The difference 
between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of 
0.05.
   To sum up, all of the hypothesis 1 were supported. This means 
that in every way the study measured self-interested reporting 
behavior(by the number of reporter’s comments, the number of sources, 
interviewees/panels, and chroma-keys, and average length of comments), 
both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels showed 
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such behaviors. Terrestrial broadcasters were proved to report more 
news that supports the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters than general programming channels did(which 
implies that general programming channels also shows self-interested 
reporting behavior in that they were more critical of the regulation that 
terrestrial broadcasters support. 
5-2. Outcome for 're-approval of general programming 
channels(RAGPC)' (2013. 3. 31~2014. 7. 13)
   In this section, both descriptive results and hypothesis verification 
results for the hypothesis 2 (General programming channels are more 
likely to report news that supports re-approval of general programming 
channels than  terrestrial broadcasters do) are summarized. General 
programming channels are more likely to show self-interested reporting 












<Table 17> The order of news items related to RAGPC
  First, the order of news items arranged within a news program were 
looked at. The order is categorized into three levels depending in 
which time segment the news item appeared. If it appeared in the 
beginning segment (the 30% time segment from the start of the 
program) of the whole program, then it was categorized into the 
'beginning'. If it appeared in the middle segment (the middle 30-70% 
time segment), then categorized into the 'middle'. if it appeared in the 
ending segment(the 30% time segment toward the end of the program), 
then categorized into the 'end'.
  <Table 17> shows that most of the news items from general 
programming channels are put in the beginning and middle segment, 
while most of those from terrestrial broadcasters are put in the end. It 
can be inferred that general programming channels put more 
importance in reporting about re-approval of general programming 
channels in that most of the news items were put in the beginning or 
in the middle. 
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   The news items were collected from the three terrestrial TV 
broadcasters (KBS, SBS, MBC), four general programming channels(TV 
Chosun, Channel A, MBN, JTBC), and 2 newspapers(Joongang Ilbo, 
Chosun Ilbo). The average length of the news items from the three 
terrestrial TV broadcasters was 175 seconds; 52 seconds for those from 
the four general programming channels; 1,118 words for those from the 
two newspapers. 
   The average proportions of subjective comments in the news report 
are as described below in the <Table 18>. Among the three terrestrial 
TV broadcasters, MBC had the highest subjective comment rate, which 
can be also interpreted as 'opinion intervention rate', and among the 
four general programming channels, MBN had the highest subjective 
comment rate. Joongang Ilbo showed 20% of subjective comment rate 
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<Table 18> Summary of descriptive results for hypothesis 2
  The types of news reporters' opinion intervention also varied between 
terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels. For 
terrestrial TV broadcasters, mostly quoting or statistics were used. For 
general programming channels, there were a lot of use of facial 
expressions, embellished remarks, and also statistics. The Table above 
shows the average number of news sources (including interviewees and 
panels) used for/against re-approval of general programming channels. 
   Unlike the result related for the gross cap regulation of advertising 
time for terrestrial broadcasters, distinct reporting behaviors between the 












Total 9 12 21
general programming channels. General programming channels used 
chroma-key that favored re-approval of general programming channels, 
while terrestrial TV broadcasters did not use chroma-key. To sum up, 
the study finally measured the total length of comments from both 
opposing and consenting sides. <Table  18> above shows a pattern of 
distinct reporting behaviors between terrestrial broadcasters and general 
programming channel. For general programming channels and 
newspapers, the comment length of supporters for the policy was 
relatively long compared to that of opponents against the policy. For 
terrestrial TV broadcasters, the comments from supporters of the policy 
were rarely featured in the news reports
Hypothesis Test Results
<Table 19> Results for Hypothesis 2-1
*p>0.05
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   Hypothesis 2-1 is not supported (p>0.05, x2=.875). As shown in 
<Table 19>, the number of reporter/anchor/MC comments (by terrestrial 
TV broadcasters) supporting re-approval of general programming 
channels is 5, whereas the number of reporter/anchor/MC comments 
(by general programming channels) supporting re-approval of general 
programming channel is 4. The difference between them is not 
statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05. 
<Table 20> Results for Hypothesis 2-2
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 2-2 is not supported(p>0.05, t=-.84, df=19, st.dv=.42).  
As shown in <Table 20>, the number of supporting sources for 
re-approval of general programming channels (mean=.42) used by 
terrestrial TV broadcasters is a little bit less than that of general 
programming channels (mean=.85). The difference between them is not 
statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.
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Total 1 20 21
<Table 21> Results for Hypothesis 2-3
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 2-3 is not supported(p>0.05, t=-.71, df=19, st.dv=-.21). 
As shown in <Table 21>, the number of supporting interviewees/panels 
for re-approval of general programming channels used by terrestrial TV 
broadcasters (mean=.21) is a little bit less than that of general 
programming channels (mean=.42). The difference between them is not 
statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.
<Table 22> Results for Hypothesis 2-4
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 2-4 is not supported(p>0.05, x2=2.1). As shown above, 
terrestrial TV broadcasters used 0 chroma-key supporting re-approval of 
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general programming channels. Likewise general programming channels 
use only 1 chroma-key that supports re-approval of general 
programming channels.  In other words, both terrestrial TV 
broadcasters and general programming channels rarely use chroma-keys 
to support re-approval of general programmin channels.  The difference 
between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of 
.05. 
<Table 23> Results for Hypothesis 2-5
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 2-5 is not supported(p>0.05, t=-1.8, df=19, st.dv=-5.23). 
As shown in <Table 23>, the averge comment length of supporting 
side for re-approval of general programming channels  used by the 
terrestrial TV broadcasters (mean=1.28)  is a little bit less than that of 
general programming channels  (mean=6.52). T-value (-1.8) for both 
types of firms is the same. The difference between them is not 
statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.
- 87 -
   To sum up, hypothesis 2 is not supported. This means that for the 
issue of re-approval of general programming channels, both types of 
broadcasting firms did not show self-interested reporting behavior. 
Unlike the issue of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters, they reported more “neutrally” on the issue of 
re-approval of general programming channel. Moreover, there were a 
lot less news items on this issue. this means that they were relatively 
quiet around this issue.
5-3. Outcome for the KCC (Reporting on KCC)
  In this section, the results for Hypothesis 3 will be offered. Both 
terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels are likely to 
show self-interested reporting behavior when there is an interest at 
stake. Moreover, the results on the two time periods (GCRAT period 
and RAGPC period) will be reviewed.








KBS 3 74 77
TV Chosun 21 19 40
Total 24 93 117
Number of Criticizing 
Sources against KCC
Mean St.dv St.error
KBS .09 -.48 .12TV Chosun .57
Hypothesis Test Results
<Table 24> Results for Hypothesis 3-1
*p<0.05
   Hypothesis 3-1 is supported (p<0.05, x2=38.14). As shown in 
<Table 24>, KBS aired only 3 comments (by reporter/anchor/MC) 
criticizing the KCC during the review period of the gross cap 
regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters.  On the other 
hand, TV Chosun aired 21 comments which criticized the KCC during 
that period. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at 
the probability level of .05. 
<Table 25> Results for Hypothesis 3-2
*p<0.05
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   Hypothesis 3-2 is supported(p>0.05, t=-3.9, df=115, st.dv=-.48). The 
average number of criticizing sources against the KCC used by KBS is 
.09. On the other hand, the number of such sources used by TV 
Chosun is .57.  The difference between them is statistically meaningful 
at the probability level of .05.
<Table 26> Results for Hypothesis 3-3
*p<0.05
   Hypothesis 3-3 is supported(p<0.05, t=-3.42, df=115, st.dv=.12). As 
shown in <Table 26>, the average number of criticizing 
interviewees/panels against the KCC used by KBS is .015, during the 
review period of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters.  On the other hand, the number of those used 
by TV Chosun is .60  The difference between them is statistically 







KBS 0 14 14
TV Chosun 1 6 7
Total 1 20 21
Avg Comment Length of 
Criticizing Side on KCC
Mean St.dv St.error
KBS .59 -1.85 .85TV Chosun 2.45
<Table 27> Results for Hypothesis 3-4
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 3-4 is not supported(p>0.05, x2=2.965). As shown in 
<Table 27>, KBS used 2 chroma-keys criticizing the KCC.  On the 
other hand, TV Chosun aired 0 chroma-key which criticizes the KCC 
during the GCRAT period. The difference between them is not 
statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05. 
<Table 28> Results for Hypothesis 3-5
*p<0.05
   Hypothesis 3-5 is supported. The average comment length of 
criticizing side against the KCC (by KBS) is .59, on the other hand, 
that of TV Chosun is 2.45  The difference between them is 












KBS 9 45 54
TV Chosun 0 34 34
Total 9 79 88
<Table 29> Summary for Hypothesis 3
   To sum up, for Hypothesis 3, all of the sub-hypotheses except 3-4 
was supported. This means that KBS criticized the KCC less than TV 
Chosun did during the period of the gross cap regulation of advertising 
time for terrestrial broadcasters in terms of the number of reporters' 
comments, used panels and interviewees, and the length of criticizing 
comments, etc. but not in terms of  using chroma-key. Thus, although 
hypothesis 3-4 was not supported, it can be concluded that there exists 
self-interested reporting behavior regarding the KCC. 
2) For the RAGPC period (2013. 3. 31~2014. 7. 13)
Hypothesis Test Results
<Table 30> Results for Hypothesis 4-1
*p<0.05
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Number of Criticizing Sources 
against KCC
Mean St.dv St.error
KBS .16 .10 .07TV Chosun .05
   Hypothesis 4-1 is supported(p<0.05, x2=6.312). As shown in <Table 
30>, KBS aired 9 comments of criticizing the KCC, during the review 
period of re-approval of general programming channels.  On the other 
hand, TV Chosun aired 0 comment which criticizes the KCC during 
that period. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at 
the probability level of .05. 
<Table 31> Results for Hypothesis 4-2
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 4-2 is not supported(p>0.05, t=1.52, df=86, st.dv=.1). As 
shown in <Table 31>, the average number of criticizing sources against 
the KCC used by KBS is .16, during the review period of re-approval 
of general programming channels. On the other hand, those used by 
TV chosun is 0.05  The difference between them is not statistically 
meaningful at the probability level of .05.
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KBS 9 45 54
TV Chosun 1 33 34
Total 10 78 88
<Table 32> Results for Hypothesis 4-3
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 4-3 is supported(p<0.05, t=2.32, df=86, st.dv=.16). As 
shown in <Table 32>, the average number of criticizing 
interviewees/panels against the KCC used by KBS is .22, during the 
review period of re-approval of general programming channels. On the 
other hand, those used by TV Chosun is 0.05 during that period. The 
difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability 
level of .05.
<Table 33> Results for Hypothesis 4-4
*p<0.05
   Hypothesis 4-4 is supported(p<0.05, x2=3.902). As shown in <Table 
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4-1, 4-3, 4-4 4-2, 4-5
33>, KBS aired 9 chroma-keys criticizing the KCC, during the review 
period of re-approval of general programming channels.  On the other 
hand, TV Chosun aired 1 chroma-key that criticizes the KCC during 
that period. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at 
the probability level of .05. 
<Table 34> Results for Hypothesis 4-5
*p>0.05
   Hypothesis 4-5 is not supported(p>0.05, t=1.57, df=86, st.dv=.54). 
As shown in <Table 34>, the average comment length of criticizing 
side against the KCC used by KBS is 1.01, during the review period 
of re-approval of general programming channel. On the other hand, 
those used by TV Chosun is 0.47 during that period. The difference 
between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of 
.05.
<Table 35> Summary for Hypothesis 4
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Fact 0/4,5,6,7/+1 Fact x/9,10,11,12/-1
Supporting 44(KBS)/11(TV Chosun) 4(KBS)/9(TV Chosun)
Opposing 12(KBS)/14(TV Chosun) 1(KBS)/9(TV Chosun)
Total 56(KBS)/25(TV Chosun) 5(KBS)/18(TV Chosun)
   For Hypothesis 4, sub-hypotheses 4-1, 4-3, 4-4 were supported, 
while sub-hypotheses 4-2, 4-5 were not. This means that TV Chosun 
criticized the KCC less than KBS did in the review period of 
re-approval of general programming channels in some aspects but not 
in other aspects. For instance, the number of sources used for 
criticizing the KCC and the average length of comments criticizing the 
KCC showed no difference between KBS and TV Chosun. However, 
TV Chosun and KBS showed self-interest reporting behavior in terms 
of the number of reporters' comments, used interviewees/panels, and the 
use of chroma-keys. 
5-4. Outcome for Quality Index 
   In this section, results for Hypothesis 5(KBS is more likely to have 
higher score on the “quality index” than TV Chosun is) are offered.  
Descriptive Results




KBS .39 .49 .7TV Chosun -.1
   It is easy to tell which one between KBS and TV Chosun has a 
higher quality score in its biased reporting simply by looking at 
<Table 36>. For the score +1 area (which indicates higher quality) 
KBS has 56, while TV Chosun has less than half of KBS with 25. 
For the score –1 area (which indicates lower quality), TV Chosun(18) 
has more than triple the number of KBS(5). To compare the average 
scores of KBS and TV Chosun by using t-test, each of the score was 
then multiplied by the length of comments and divided by the total 
length of the comments.
<Table 37> Results for Hypothesis 5
*p<0.05
   Since the quality scores' difference is significant (p<0.05, t=6.25, 
st.dv=.49), Hypothesis 5 is supported.  <Table 37> shows that quality 
score for KBS is .39.  On the other hand, quality score for TV 
chosun is -.1.  In conclusion, KBS has higher quality index score than 
TV Chosun, meaning that although their reporting may be both biased, 
KBS’ news reports are more factually-based, thus   “higher” in quality. 
The result has turned out as expected in that KBS is a public 
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broadcaster, the majority of whose revenues comes from the license 
fee, whereas TV Chosun is a private broadcaster which has more 
concerns about economic profits. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion
   This study investigated how media firms' self-interest affects their 
news reporting behavior, particularly focusing on broadcast news 
reporting on media policies. Biased news reporting tailored toward 
media corporate self-interest, which can be increasingly more observed 
in broadcasting, is a serious problem that hinders fair journalism in 
Korea. This phenomenon needs to be taken particularly serious when 
broadcasters practice biased reporting regarding public policies that 
could significantly affect society.     
   This study addressed this problem by examining the role of 
broadcasters' self-interest in reporting biased news on two media 
policies, which were closely related to their self-interest. Major 
terrestrial broadcasters(KBS, MBC, SBS) and general programming 
channels(TV Chosun, Channel A, MBN, JTBC), Korea’s major rival 
broadcasting groups, were selected for examination. News reports on 
two major broadcasting policies were selected for analysis. The two 
broadcasting policies are i) the gross cap regulation of advertising time 
for terrestrial broadcasters and ii) re-approval of general programming 
channels. These two policies were specifically chosen for the study, 
because they have the potential to show biased reporting given that 
terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels have 
distinctly different interests in regards to the two policies. Therefore, it 
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can be reasonably expected that news reporting of terrestrial 
broadcasters and general programming channels differs on the policies. 
The gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial 
broadcasters is considered to have significant advantages for major 
terrestrial TV broadcasters who are competing with general 
programming channels in the increasingly competitive broadcast 
advertising market. It was expected that with the adoption of the 
regulation, the terrestrial TV broadcasters would be in much better 
shape in terms of advertising revenue,25) while general programming 
channels could get stuck in a situation where their advertising revenue 
would not increase or even get shrunken. This is why this study 
assumed that terrestial broadcasters will show biased reporting 
behaviors that would encourage the adoption of the regulation. All of 
the hypotheses proposed regarding this regulation were supported. 
Terrestrial broadcasters were proved to report more news that supports 
the regulation than general programming channels did. This could 
imply that  general programming channels also showed self-interested 
reporting behavior in that they were more critical of the gross 
advertisement cap regulation that terrestrial broadcasters support. 
   However, Hypothesis 2 regarding the issue of re-approval of 
25) After a prolonged debate on the pros and cons of the regulation, 'the 
gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters' was 
finally adopted in April 2015. However, mid-program advertising is still 
not allowed for the terrestrial TV broadcasters.
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general programming channels was not supported. There were a lot 
less news items on this issue.  The reason why Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported may not be due to fair journalism in broadcasting news but 
because of the lack of news report items on the issue. Terrestrial 
broadcasters kept relatively low profile on this matter. This was 
probably because the issue was not considered as important and 
influential for them as the gross cap regulation of advertising time for 
terrestrial broadcasters.
   This study also explored how the two broadcasting groups reported 
on the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) for the period when 
they covered the debates around the gross cap regulation of advertising 
time for terrestrial broadcasters, and re-approval of general 
programming channels. The study hypothesized that there would be 
less criticism of the KCC, the government regulatory agency that 
governs the adoption and implementation of media policies related to 
terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels, by a media 
company that supported the adoption of media policies in line with its 
self-interests. Interestingly, self-interested reporting behavior was also 
detected when both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming 
channels mentioned about the KCC. For instance, KBS was less critical 
of the KCC during the period when the gross cap regulation of 
advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters was being discussed. TV 
Chosun was less critical of the KCC during the period that re-approval 
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of general programming channels was being discussed. This result 
implies that media firms' practice of self-interested reporting could aim 
to affect not only the issues the news report is covering but also the 
institution that has control power over the issues. 
   Furthermore, the study looked at the quality index for both 
terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels. The quality 
index measured which broadcast companies aired more factually-based 
news reports despite the potential for biased reporting derived from 
mainstream media’s self-interest. If a news report was more factually 
based, the score was closer to +1, and if a news report was less 
factually based, the score was closer to –1. Means to calculate the 
quality index were created in the study. One of the interesting findings 
regarding quality index is that although both KBS and TV Chosun 
were biased in their reporting, KBS’ quality in biased reporting was 
much higher than that of TV Chosun. That is, KBS, a pubic 
broadcaster with 60% of its revenue coming from the TV license fee, 
voices out its argument more on a factual basis than a general 
programming channel does. 
   The results of this study are significant in two ways. First, most of 
the hypotheses regarding self-interested reporting were supported, which 
means that self-interested news reporting practices do exist in Korea. 
Specifically, the results showed that media firms reacted sensitively to 
media related policies and were likely to practice biased reporting that 
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fit their self-interests. Second, the result showed that a public terrestrial 
broadcaster demonstrated a higher quality index than a general 
programming channel, which means that a public broadcasting company 
was more likely to practice factual news reporting than a private 
broadcasting company, which has more concern about economic profits.  
However, this study has limitations in that it only confirmed the 
existence of mainstream media’s self-interested reporting in Korean 
journalism rather than systematically explaining how related factors 
interacted and influenced the generation of biased news. In other 
words, it focused more on the final news product than the processes 
that led to that product. 
   This study is meaningful in that it investigated the influence of 
mainstream media’s self-interest on news reporting in Korean 
journalism. There has been a dearth of studies on this phenomenon. 
Future studies on the influence of media firms’ self-interest on news 
reporting should go into more depth, covering a wider range of 
controversial public issues. Eventually, these studies could generate 
societal agreement about effective and realistic guidelines to curb 
self-interested new reporting in Korean journalism.
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Code Book for the Gross Cap Regulation of 
Advertising Time for Terrestrial Broadcasters
A. ID
V1. 아이템 ID
(          )
V2. 어느 방송사의 프로그램인가?
1) KBS 2) MBC 3) SBS 4) TV조선 5) MBN 6) 채널A 7) JTBC
(         )
V3. 방송 날짜
월/날짜/요일/년도    
요일: 1)일 2)월 3)화 4)수 5)목 6)금 7)토
(            )
V4. 기사 순서 (*이거는 연구자가 체크함-코더들은 leave it blank)
1)처음 2)중간 3)끝
(             )
V5. 기사 길이
(       초)
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B. 정량적 편향성: 등장인물의 균형성
V1. (진행자·앵커·기자)
전체 뉴스보도 대비 각각 몇 % 수준에서 본인의 주관적 논평을 곁들였나? 논평은 
주제에 대해 찬성하였가? 반대하였는가?
(          %)
V2. 진행자·앵커·기자 발언의 편향성 유형은 주로 어떤 것이었나? (중복 가능)
1) 주관적 감정 2)윤색적 꾸밈말 3)역사적 사례 등 4)얼굴 표정 5)윤리적 가치 6)
인용 7) 기타
(             )
V3. 광고총량제 옹호 측 취재원의 수?
(               )
V4. 광고총량제 비판 측 취재원의 수?
 (             )
V5. 광고총량제 옹호 측 인터뷰이·출연자의 수?
(              ) (누구였는지 memo: 예) 대학교수/정치인/논객 etc)
V6. 광고총량제 비판 측 인터뷰이·출연자의 수?
(             ) (누구였는지 memo: 예) 대학교수/정치인/논객 etc)
V7. 크로마키 처리 여부 및 내용
1)광고총량제 반대 진영의 주장 요지가 크로마키로 처리
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2)광고총량제 찬성 진영의 주장 요지가 크로마키로 처리
3)어느 일방의 주장 요지라고 판단하기 어렵다
4)크로마키 처리 없음
(         ), (크로마키 내용:                                     )
V8. 광고총량제 옹호 측 진영의 평균 발언길이는?
(       분     초)
V9. 광고총량제 비판 측 진영의 평균 발언길이는?
(       분     초)
C. 정성적 편향성: 발언의 편향성
1) 사건(발생) 과정에 대한 사실보도
2) 사실+분석





8) 사실 없는 균형적 발언
9) 사실 없는 광고총량제 지지
10) 사실 없는 광고총량제 반대
11) 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 지지
12) 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 반대
13) 사실 또는 사실 없는 기타 발언
(중복 입력 가능:                       )
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Appendix B: 
Code Guide Book for the Gross Cap Regulation of 
Advertising Time for Terrestrial Broadcasters
A. ID
V1. 코딩 순서대로 번호를 준다. 뉴스 프로그램에서 ‘뉴스거리’ 한 꼭지 개념과 대
등한 수준에서 추출한다.
V2. 어느 방송사의 TV 뉴스 프로그램인지 그 이름을 찾아 그 번호를 기입한다.
V3. (03)월 (12)일 (6)금요일처럼 두 칸, 두 칸, 한 칸씩 기입한다.
V4. 코더들은 leave blank. 연구자가 작성할 것임.
①처음: 전체 기사 중 제일 먼저 나와 있는 30%.
②중간: 전체 기사 중 중간에 있는 40%.
③끝: 전체 기사 중 가장 나중에 있는 30%.
V5. 기사 길이
아이템의 길이를 초 단위로 재서 기입한다. 앵커멘트 부분도 포함시킨다.
B. 정량적 편향성: 등장인물의 균형성
V1. 진행자·앵커·기자의 정의: 프로그램을 이끄는 사람/프로그램의 진행을 주도하
는 사람, 기사를 취재하는 사람 (진행자·앵커·기자를 하나로 묶어서 본다). 
전체 뉴스보도 대비 몇% 수준에서 주관적 논평(사실이 확인되지 않은 개인의 의
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견)이 있었나 쓴다. 예) 20%
V2. 중복 입력 가능
①주관적 감정: 사실이 확인되지 않은 개인의 주관적 감정을 표현할 때
②윤색적 꾸밈말: 사실을 과장하거나 미화함을 비유적으로 이르는 말을 사용할 때
③역사적 사례 등: 역사적 사례 등을 대면서 개인의 의견을 표현할 때
④얼굴 표정: 제 3자가 봤을 때 얼굴표정이 사안에 대하여 분명히 지지하거나 반
대할 때 (예: 광고총량제에 대한 얘기를 하는데 얼굴을 막 찡그리거나 비웃음는 표
정)
⑤윤리적 가치: 윤리적 가치를 이유로 대며 개인의 주관적 의견을 표현할 때
⑥인용: 다른 사람의 말을 인용하며 자신의 주관적 의견을 표현할 때
⑦기타: 발언의 편향성 유형을 코더가 직접 적는다.
V3. 취재원의 정의: 10초 내외의 짧은 발언을 하는 외부 인물. 예) 행인/ 뉴스 소
스.
취재원의 수를 적는다
V4. 취재원의 수를 적는다
V5. 인터뷰이·출연자의 정의: 뉴스 스튜디오에 착석해 진행자의 인터뷰에 응하거나
(인터뷰이) 내지 상호간에 대담 내지 토론을 전개하는 인물들(출연자, 흔히 ‘논객’
으로 지칭)을 묶어서 지칭한다.
인터뷰이·출연자의 수를 적는다. 그리고 그게 누구였는지도 적는다. 예: 대학교수/
정치인/lobbyist 등
V6. 인터뷰이·출연자의 수를 적는다. 그리고 그게 누구였는지도 적는다. 예: 대학
교수/정치인/lobbyist 등
V7. 크로마키의 정의: 텔레비전 방송의 화면 합성 기술(자막같은)
반대/찬성 진영의 주장 요지가 크로마키로 처리 되어있는지 확인한다. 판단하기 
어려울 때는 3번. 크로마키 처리가 없을 때는 4번을 적는다. 
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그리고 코더는 크로마키의 내용이 무엇이었는지 적는다.
V8. 옹호 측 진영(진행자·앵커·기자, 취재원, 인터뷰이·출연자 다 합쳐서 옹호 발언
을 한 사람들)의 평균 발언길이를 구한다.
V9. 반대 측 진영(진행자·앵커·기자, 취재원, 인터뷰이·출연자 다 합쳐서 옹호 발언
을 한 사람들)의 평균 발언길이를 구한다.
C. 정성적 편향성: 발언의 편향성
1. 사건(발생) 과정에 대한 사실보도: 이 사실이 구체적으로 무엇이었는지 쓴다/어
떤 내용이였는지 간단히 적는다.
2. 사실26)+분석: 분석의 내용도 간단하게 memo한다
3. 사실+양측 입장을 균형있게 반영
4. 사실+광고총량제 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
5. 사실+광고총량제 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
6. 사실+방송통신위원회 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
7. 사실+방송통신위원회 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
8. 사실 없는27) 균형적 발언
9. 사실 없는 광고총량제 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
10. 사실 없는 광고총량제 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
11. 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는
다.
12. 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는
다.






26) fact가 뒷받침 되어 있는.
27) fact가 아닌 개인의 의견이 뒷받침 되어 있는.
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국문초록
방송의 자사이기주의 보도: 
미디어 정책 보도를 중심으로
서울대학교 언론정보학과
유수연
   본 연구는 한국의 방송 뉴스가 자사의 이해와 관련된 정책에 대해 
어떻게 보도하는지 살펴보았다. 방송뉴스가 공정하고 불편부당해야 
함에도 불구하고, 한국의 방송뉴스 보도는 자사이기주의에 의해 편파
적인 성향을 보이고 있다고 알려졌기 때문이다. 이러한 가정을 검증
하기 위해 구체적으로 본 논문에서는 지상파방송에 유리하고 종합편
성채널(종편)에 불리한 ‘지상파 광고총량제’ 및 ‘종편재승인 정책’에 
대해 지상파TV와 종편이 어떻게 차별적으로 보도하는지를 조사하였
다. 그 결과, 지상파TV는 광고총량제에 대해 우호적으로 보도하였고, 
종편은 이에 대해 다소 부정적인 보도를 한 것으로 드러났다. 지상파 
광고총량제는 지상파TV의 경영수지 개선에 긍정적인 반면, 경쟁사인 
종편TV에는 부정적인 측면이 많기 때문인 것으로 해석된다. 구체적
으로 지상파 광고총량제 정책에 대해 지상파TV는 앵커의 논조방향, 
취재원 수, 패널/인터뷰이 수, 크로마키 사용 정도 등에서 종편과 유
의미한 차이를 보이고 있었다. 반면 종편재승인 정책에 대해서는 지
상파TV나 종편 모두 의미 있는 차이를 보이지는 않았다. 종편재승인 
정책이 자사 이해와 직접적인 연관성이  없고 인허가 정책에 대한 
보도가 해당 정책의 설정에 크게 영향을 미치지 않기 때문인 것으로 
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판단된다. 한 가지 흥미로운 사실은, 지상파TV와 종편이 이해가 엇
갈리는 방송정책이 수립되는 지점 전후에 방송규제기구인 방송통신위
원회(KCC)에 대해 비판하는 보도를 지양하는 추세를 보이고 있다는 
점이다. 사실을 기초로 한 자사이기주의식 보도를 보이는지, 아니면 
자기주장에 기초한 단순한 자사이기주의식 보도인지를 가늠하는 자사
이기주의 보도의 질적 성향도 검토하였다. 그 결과, 지상파TV가 이
윤추구 중심의 종편에 비해 사실에 기초한 자사이기주의식 보도가 많
은 것으로 드러났다. 이 논문의 의의는 양적, 질적 차원에서 자사의 
이해와 밀접한 정책 이슈에 대해 지상파TV와 종편이 자사이기주의에 
입각한 보도를 하고 있음을 입증하고 있다는 점이다. 자사이기주의식 
방송뉴스 보도에 대한 사회적 대응이 필요한 시점이다. 그럼에도 불
구하고, 본 연구가 자사이기주의가 구체적으로 어떠한 맥락에서 발생
하는지 체계적으로 기술하고 있기는 하나, 자사이기주의가 어떠한 요
인들에 의해 유도되는지에 대한 설명적 분석은 적었다. 이에 대한 후
속연구가 필요하다.  
주요어: 자사이기주의 보도, 광고총량제, 종편재승인, 방송통신위원회, 
지상파 방송, 종합편성채널
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